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Abstract
In the k-junta testing problem, a tester has to efficiently decide whether a given function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a k-junta (i.e., depends on at most k of its input bits) or is ε-far from any k-
junta. Our main result is a quantum algorithm for this problem with query complexity O˜(
√
k/ε)
and time complexity O˜(n
√
k/ε). This quadratically improves over the query complexity of the
previous best quantum junta tester, due to Atıcı and Servedio. Our tester is based on a new
quantum algorithm for a gapped version of the combinatorial group testing problem, with an
up to quartic improvement over the query complexity of the best classical algorithm. For our
upper bound on the time complexity we give a near-linear time implementation of a shallow
variant of the quantum Fourier transform over the symmetric group, similar to the Schur-Weyl
transform. We also prove a lower bound of Ω(k1/3) queries for junta-testing (for constant ε).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Quantum property testing
Many computational problems are too hard to solve perfectly in any reasonable amount of time
(especially if P 6= NP, as seems likely). Accordingly, much of theoretical as well as practical
computer science is about trying to efficiently solve those problems in a weaker sense. Examples
are trying to approximate the optimal solution, trying to solve the problem fast on average, trying
to solve it fast on most instances, etc. A structured model for the latter is property testing. Here
our goal is to test whether a given (usually very large) object f has a certain property P. Typically
the hardest instances of the problem are the ones that are on the boundary, “just outside” of the
property, where one needs to look at a large part of f to decide if it is in or out of the property. But,
in many cases such instances tend to appear due to noise or other imperfections, and as such should
not really be rejected. The setting of property testing excludes such instances: it assumes that the
given instance f either has the property P, or is at least somewhat “far” from P (i.e., far from all
instances that have property P, according to some suitable distance measure). This “promise” on
the inputs makes many hard problems much easier, and many property testers have been found over
the last two decades to efficiently test properties of very large objects, see for instance [34]. Note
that a tester even allows us to conclude something about inputs that are outside of the promise: if
a tester accepts input f with high probability, then f must be close to at least one element that
has the property P.
In this paper we focus on quantum algorithms for property testing. These are substantially
less studied than classical algorithms, but quantum property testing has been receiving increasing
attention in the last few years, both for testing properties of classical objects and for testing
properties of quantum objects. See [44] for a recent survey.
1.2 Group testing
We first develop a new quantum algorithm for a version of the (combinatorial) group testing prob-
lem.1 Group testing was invented in World War II to efficiently identify ill soldiers [30]. Suppose
n soldiers have each given samples of their blood, and up to k of them are ill. One way to identify
the ill ones is to separately test each of the n blood samples. However, blood tests are expensive,
and if k  n then something much more efficient can be done. By combining parts of the blood
samples of a subset S of all soldiers and testing the combined sample, we can determine whether at
least one of the soldiers in S has the disease, at the expense of only one blood test. Using binary
search we can then identify one ill soldier using O(log n) tests, and all k ill soldiers using O(k log n)
tests.2
Here we consider a “gapped” decision version of the group testing problem, which in its simplest
form is the following:
Gapped group testing (GGT). For some set A ⊆ [n], define fA : 2[n] → {0, 1} by
setting fA(S) = 1 iff S intersects A. Given the ability to query an fA where either
1To avoid confusion: while we use the established term “group testing” here, this is not a property testing problem
in the sense described above, because we have no “in the property or far from the property” promise here.
2O(k logn) tests is essentially optimal for simple information-theoretic reasons: each test gives at most one bit of
information, but by identifying the k ill soldiers we learn log
(
n
k
)
= Ω(k log(n/k)) bits of information. There is a large
literature that optimizes the constant factor and other aspects of group testing algorithms, see for instance [31].
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|A| ≤ k or |A| ≥ k + d, decide which is the case.
Note that the function fA is like a blood test, where A is the set of all ill soldiers and the input S is
the set of the soldiers whose blood we include in the tested sample. The function outputs 1 exactly
when at least one of the soldiers in S is ill.
Recently, Belovs [10] showed that if |A| ≤ k, then one can identify A with O(√k) quantum
queries to fA. Clearly this algorithm can be used to solve the GGT problem for d = 1. The
randomized query complexity of this problem for d = 1 is Θ˜(k) (see Section 3.1 for references and
proofs about the randomized case), so we have a quadratic quantum improvement over classical.
Things get more interesting as d grows. In Section 3 we show a tight bound on the quantum
query complexity of GGT of Θ(
√
k/d) for all d ≤ k, while the randomized complexity of this
problem is Θ˜(k) for d ≤ √k and Θ˜((k/d)2) for d ≥ √k. We subsequently use this quantum
algorithm as a subroutine for our junta testing algorithm, but we feel the GGT problem is quite
interesting by itself as well, and may find applications elsewhere. We now mention several other
reasons why our GGT algorithm is interesting.
Fourth-power improvement. By considering our bounds on the complexity of the GGT prob-
lem, we see that there is a quartic (fourth-power) quantum improvement in query complexity for
the regime
√
k ≤ d ≤ k. Most speed-ups obtained by quantum algorithms are either exponential
(mostly, for computational problems from algebra or number theory) or quadratic or less (for al-
gorithms based on Grover’s algorithm or its generalizations). In contrast, our algorithm provides
a fourth-power speedup, which is quite surprising given that it is based on the OR function, for
which the best-possible quantum speedup is only quadratic.
Only a few other examples of such speed-ups are known: a cubic speed-up for exponential
congruences by van Dam and Shparlinski [28], a quartic speed-up for finding counterfeit coins by
Iwama et al. [37], a cubic improvement for monotonicity testing on the hypercube by Belovs and
Blais [12] (though that work was done after the work presented here), and a quartic improvement
for learning an “exact-half junta” by Belovs [10]. Among these problems, a matching lower bound
is known only for the last one.
Very recently, several new separations were found for total Boolean functions: a quartic speed-up
of bounded-error quantum algorithms over deterministic classical algorithms [3], and a 2.5th-power
speed-up of bounded-error quantum algorithms over bounded-error classical algorithms [15].
Direct use of adversary bound. We construct the algorithm from a feasible solution to the
(dual) semidefinite program for the adversary bound. Reichardt et al. [36, 47, 43] have shown that
the adversary bound characterizes quantum query complexity up to a constant factor. This means
that, in principle, any quantum query algorithm can be derived as a solution to this semidefinite
program. However, the number of new quantum algorithms that have actually been obtained in this
way (without any intermediate framework between the semidefinite program and the algorithm)
remains fairly small. Moreover, the majority of these algorithms are developed in the learning graph
methodology [8], while our algorithm is based on different ideas, borrowing from [10].
Robustness. Our algorithm still works if the action of the input function fA(S) is not defined for
some values of S. For instance, if |A| = k and S intersects A, the value of fA(S) can be anything:
0, 1, or even undefined. The same is true if |A| = k + d and S ∩ A = ∅. We say that such S
3
are irrelevant variables. This property turns out to be very useful in applications of the GGT
algorithm, in particular when we use it as a subroutine in our junta tester.
As far as we know, such a property of a quantum algorithm was not previously studied or even
explicitly defined. However, it turns out that this property is automatically satisfied for a quantum
algorithm derived from the adversary bound if the latter satisfies some additional conditions. We
obtain a similar behavior for the tight composition property of the adversary bound in the presence
of irrelevant variables.
Time-efficient implementation. Our algorithm is one of the few quantum algorithms derived
from the adversary bound with a time-efficient implementation, i.e., one that is efficient in total
number of gates as well as in total number of queries (in general, the time complexity of the
adversary-derived algorithm can be exponentially large in the number of input bits to the problem).
Other examples are the formula-evaluation algorithm of Reichardt and Sˇpalek [49] and the algorithm
for st-connectivity of Belovs and Reichardt [13].
The time complexity of our algorithm is O˜(n
√
k/d), roughly n times its query complexity. This
is probably the best one can hope for: the oracle takes an n-qubit input register, so it takes Ω(n)
gates just to touch all those qubits. Thus, any algorithm trying to beat our running time can only
afford to change a small fraction of the string given to the input oracle. Also, realistic oracles will
typically take time Ω(n) to answer the query.
The key to our time-efficient algorithm is an efficient, O˜(n)-time, implementation of the quantum
Fourier transform (QFT) on the linear space which we denote by Mn. It is of dimension 2n and has
an orthonormal basis indexed by the set of all subsets of [n]. The symmetric group Sn acts naturally
on this space by permuting its basis elements, hence Mn can be considered as an Sn-module (a
representation of Sn).
Most of the previous work in this direction focused on the regular representation of Sn, called
the QFT over the symmetric group. The most efficient implementation of this kind is due to
Kawano and Sekigawa [40] and can be implemented in depth O˜(n3), improving over [7, 45, 39].
Our implementation, on the other hand, is close to the efficient quantum Schur-Weyl transform of
Bacon, Chuang and Harrow [5, 6], though their algorithm is defined for another group, namely a
product of a general linear group and a symmetric group. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first “algorithmic” application of this transformation ([6] lists a number of applications of this
transformation for quantum protocols). In order to ensure that the transform has all properties we
need and to make our paper self-contained, we describe our construction in full detail instead of
just referring to (slight modifications of) the construction of [5, 6].
1.3 Junta testing
Our main result is about junta testing. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function, and J ⊆ [n]
be the set of (indices of) variables on which the function depends. We say that f is a k-junta if
|J | ≤ k. Such functions are often studied, for instance in learning theory if most of the features are
irrelevant for the concept that needs to be learned (e.g., in biology if only a few genes determine
some biological property). We say that f is ε-far from any k-junta if the normalized Hamming
distance between f and g is at least ε for every k-junta g (i.e., f and g differ on at least ε2n inputs).
The k-junta testing problem is:
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k-junta testing. Given the ability to query an f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that is either a
k-junta or ε-far from any k-junta, decide which is the case.
We would like to test this efficiently. The primary measure of efficiency is the number of “queries,”
evaluations of f , which are usually the most expensive part of an algorithm. However, we will also
consider time complexity later.
Junta testing has been well-studied in the last decade, see [17] for a recent survey. Classically,
the best known tester is by Blais [16] and uses O(k log k+k/ε) queries to f , quadratically improving
upon an earlier tester of [32]. The best known classical lower bound is Ω(k/ε) [26].3
The best quantum tester, due to Atıcı and Servedio [4], uses O(k/ε) queries. It is based on
Fourier sampling. This quantum tester is better than Blais’s classical tester by a log k-factor (for
constant ε), but does not beat the best known classical lower bound, leaving open the possibility
of an equally efficient classical tester.
Our main result in this paper is a quantum tester with query complexity O˜(
√
k/ε), which (up
to logarithmic factors) quadratically improves over the previous best quantum junta tester and
actually beats the known classical lower bound for the first time. We also give a time-efficient
implementation.
Main theorem (informal). There is a quantum k-junta tester that uses O˜(
√
k/ε) queries and
O˜(n
√
k/ε) time (i.e., elementary quantum gates and query gates).
Similarly to the GGT problem, this time complexity is the best that one could reasonably
expect given our query complexity, because each query to f involves an n-qubit input register.
Our junta tester is described in Section 4. The idea is the following (suppressing the dependence
on ε for simplicity). If f is far from any k-junta, then it depends on some K > k variables, and
together those K−k “extra” variables will have at least ε “influence” (this will be quantified using
the Fourier coefficients of f). We divide those extra variables in sets depending on their influence,
and show that one of the following cases holds:
1. For some integer j ∈ {0, . . . , O(log k)} there are d ≥ k/2j extra variables, each of influence
at least 2j/k. We thus need to distinguish the case where there are at most k influential
variables from the case where there are at least k + d variables, each of influence roughly
2j/k. Our quantum group tester, combined with a procedure to detect variables of influence
roughly 2j/k, can distinguish these two cases using O(
√
k) queries.4
2. There are many ( k) variables of very low influence (< 1/k). In this case a random subset V
of 1/k of all variables has influence Ω(1/k) with probability close to 1. In contrast, if f is a
k-junta then with significant probability V will not contain any relevant variable, and hence
have 0 influence. We can distinguish those two cases using O(
√
k) queries.
We then put together the testers for these special cases in order to get an O˜(
√
k/ε)-query tester
that covers all cases.
3For the special case of non-adaptive junta testers (i.e., ones that choose all queries in advance, so the next query
will not depend on outcomes of earlier queries), Servedio et al. [51] very recently showed a slightly stronger lower
bound, which is bigger than the upper bound of Blais’s tester for appropriate values of ε. This shows that adaptivity
helps (slightly) for classical junta testers.
4In the setting of classical testers, Garc´ıa-Soriano [33, p. 111] also noted “a striking resemblance between group
testing and junta testing.”
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Let us now briefly mention the lower bounds we obtain. As already noted by Atıcı and Serve-
dio [4] and explained in Section 6, the classical lower bound approach for junta testing fails for quan-
tum algorithms, because the corresponding instances can be easily solved quantumly in O(log k)
queries. Instead of this, in Section 6 we describe a different approach using reduction from the
problem of testing image size of a function. This already gives a lower bound of Ω(k1/3) by the
Aaronson-Shi lower bound for the collision problem [1]. We believe that the actual complexity of
testing support size of a distribution is around Ω(
√
k), but proving this seems to require techniques
beyond the state of the art in quantum lower bounds.
1.4 Some remarks on organization
The main results of the paper—quantum algorithms for the GGT problem and junta testing—are
given in Sections 3–5. For both problems, we give two versions of the algorithm: first, a query-
efficient algorithm, and then its time-efficient implementation. Our organization of the paper is
such that a reader only interested in the query-efficient algorithms can read Sections 3 and 4,
skipping the more technical time-efficient implementations of Section 5.
For the GGT problem, a quantum query-efficient algorithm is given in Section 3.2, and a time-
efficient implementation of the same algorithm is given in Sections 5.1–5.3.
For the junta testing problem, we actually give two quantum algorithms: first, a query algorithm
with complexity O(
√
k/ε log k) in Theorem 4.1, and then an algorithm with slightly worse query
complexity O˜(
√
k/ε) and time complexity O˜(n
√
k/ε) in Theorem 5.4.
2 Preliminaries
We use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and 2A to denote the set of subsets of A. A k-subset is
a subset of size k. All matrices in this paper have real entries. If A is a matrix, A[[i, j]] denotes the
element at row i and column j. A projector always stands for an orthogonal projector. We use ΠS
to denote the projector onto a subspace S. We use log and ln to denote logarithms in base 2 and e,
respectively. The notation Fq stands for a finite field with q elements.
We assume familiarity with basic probability theory. Let B(k, p) denote the binomial distribu-
tion: Pr[B(k, p) = i] = (ki)pi(1−p)k−i. We use Hn(k,m) to denote the hypergeometric distribution,
i.e., the distribution of
∣∣A∩ [k]∣∣ when A is sampled from all m-subsets of [n] uniformly at random.
By X ∼ B, we denote that X is sampled from probability distribution B.
2.1 Quantum algorithms
Let us define quantum query algorithms. For a more complete treatment see [22]. A quantum
query algorithm is defined as a sequence of unitary transformations alternating with oracle calls:
U0 → Ox → U1 → Ox → · · · → UT−1 → Ox → UT . (1)
Here the Uis are arbitrary unitary transformations that are independent of the input. The input
oracle Ox is the same throughout the algorithm, and is the only way the algorithm accesses the
input string x = (xj). The input oracle decomposes in the following way:
Ox =
⊕
j∈[n]Ox,j , (2)
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where Ox,j is some unitary transformation that only depends on the symbol xj . In this paper x
will be a Boolean string, and we adopt the following convention: Ox,j = I if xj = 0, and Ox,j = −I
if xj = 1, where I is the identity operator.
The computation starts in a predefined state |0〉. After all the operations in (1) are performed,
some predefined output register is measured. We say that the algorithm computes a function F
(with bounded error) if, for any x in the domain, the result of the measurement is F (x) with
probability at least 2/3. The number T is the query complexity of the algorithm. The smallest
value of T among all algorithms computing f is the quantum query complexity of F , and is denoted
by Q(F ).
We will also be interested in time complexity (also known as gate complexity) of the algorithm.
It is defined as the total number of elementary quantum gates (from some fixed universal set of
gates) required to implement all the unitary transformations U0, . . . , UT .
One of our main algorithmic tools is amplitude amplification. This is encapsulated in the
following result of Brassard et al. [20, Section 2], which generalizes Grover’s quantum search algo-
rithm [35].
Lemma 2.1 (Amplitude amplification). Let A be some quantum procedure and S some set of
basis states on the algorithm’s output space. Suppose that the probability that measuring the state
A|0〉 gives a basis state in S is at least p. Then there exists another procedure B, which invokes
A and A−1 O(1/√p) many times (we sometimes call such an invocation a “round of amplitude
amplification”), such that the probability that measuring the state B|0〉 gives a basis state in S is
at least 9/10. If, in contrast, the probability of obtaining a basis state in S when measuring A|0〉
was 0, this probability will still be 0 when measuring B|0〉.
For time-efficient implementation of our algorithm, we need the following two results.
Theorem 2.2 (Phase Estimation [41, 27]). Assume a unitary U is given as a black box. There
exists a quantum algorithm that, given an eigenvector |psi〉 of U with eigenvalue eiφ, outputs a real
number w such that |w−φ| ≤ δ with probability at least 9/10. Moreover, the algorithm uses O(1/δ)
controlled applications of U and U−1 and 1δ polylog(1/δ) other elementary operations.
Lemma 2.3 (Effective Spectral Gap Lemma [43]). Let Π1 and Π2 be two orthogonal projectors in
the same vector space (not necessarily pairwise orthogonal), and R1 = 2Π1−I and R2 = 2Π2−I be
the reflections about their images. For δ ≥ 0, let Pδ be the projector on the span of all eigenvectors
of R2R1 that have eigenvalues e
iθ with |θ| ≤ δ. Then, for any vector w in the kernel of Π1, we have
‖PδΠ2w‖ ≤ δ
2
‖w‖.
2.2 Adversary bound
Here we describe the dual adversary bound, the main tool for the construction of our algorithms.
Let F : D → {0, 1}, with D ⊆ {0, 1}n, be a partial Boolean function. The (dual) adversary
bound, ADV±(F ), is defined as the optimal value of the following semi-definite optimization prob-
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lem:
minimize max
z∈D
∑
j∈[n]Xj [[z, z]] (3a)
subject to
∑
j:xj 6=yj
Xj [[x, y]] = 1 for all x, y ∈ D with F (x) 6= F (y); (3b)
Xj  0 for all j ∈ [n], (3c)
where Xj are D × D positive semi-definite matrices. Recall that Q(F ) denotes the bounded-error
quantum query complexity of F . Then, we have the following important result.
Theorem 2.4 ([36, 48, 43]). For every F , Q(F ) = Θ(ADV±(F )).
Because of Theorem 2.4, one may come up with a solution to the adversary bound instead of
explicitly constructing a quantum algorithm. This is how we construct the algorithm in Section 3.
The following “unweighted adversary bound” is a useful special case (and precursor) of the general
adversary lower bound:
Theorem 2.5 ([2]). Suppose there is a non-empty relation R ⊆ F−1(1)× F−1(0) that satisfies
(i) for each x ∈ F−1(1) appearing in R, there are at least m distinct y ∈ F−1(0) such that
(x, y) ∈ R;
(ii) for each y ∈ F−1(0) appearing in R, there are at least m′ distinct x ∈ F−1(1) such that
(x, y) ∈ R;
(iii) for each x ∈ F−1(1) and each j ∈ [n], there are at most ` distinct y ∈ F−1(0) such that
(x, y) ∈ R and xj 6= yj;
(iv) for each y ∈ F−1(0) and each j ∈ [n], there are at most `′ distinct x ∈ F−1(1) such that
(x, y) ∈ R and xj 6= yj;
Then, the bounded-error quantum query complexity of F is Ω
(√
mm′
``′
)
.
The adversary bound is also useful for function composition. Assume F : D → {0, 1}, with
D ⊆ {0, 1}n, and, for any j ∈ [n], let Gj be a partial Boolean function on mj variables. The
composed Boolean function F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn) on
∑n
j=1mj variables is defined by
(x11, . . . , x1m1 , . . . , xn1, . . . , xnmn) 7→ F
(
G1(x11, . . . , x1m1), . . . , Gn(xn1, . . . , xnmn)
)
, (4)
where the composed function is defined on the input (x11, . . . , xnmn) iff the values of all Gj on the
right-hand side of (4) are defined, and the corresponding n-tuple belongs to D.
Theorem 2.6 ([47]). We have
ADV±
(
F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn)
) ≤ ADV±(F ) max
j∈[n]
ADV±(Gj).
In particular, this theorem together with Theorem 2.4 implies
Corollary 2.7 (Tight composition result). Q
(
F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn)
)
= O
(
Q(F ) max
j∈[n]
Q(Gj)
)
.
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That is, one can compose functions without the logarithmic overhead in query complexity
that arises in the standard method of composition (which would reduce the error probability of
the algorithm for the internal functions to  1/n by taking the majority-outcome of O(log n)
independent runs of the algorithm). Notice, though, that Corollary 2.7 talks only about the query
complexity of the resulting function, not its time complexity. Accordingly, even if the functions F
and Gj can be evaluated time-efficiently, this does not imply that the algorithm for the composed
function from Corollary 2.7 can be implemented time-efficiently. In order to get a time-efficient
implementation, it is usually better to compose the algorithms for F and Gj using the standard
method.
2.3 Irrelevant Variables
Consider the following motivating example. Let G1, . . . , Gn be partial Boolean functions. We define
the “robust conjunction” of the functions Gi,
H(x) =
∧˜
i∈[n]Gi(x) , (5)
as the partial Boolean function H given by the following: if G1(x) = · · · = Gn(x) = 1 (in particular,
x is in the domain of all Gi), then H(x) = 1; if there exists an i for which Gi(x) = 0 (in particular,
x is in the domain of Gi), then H(x) = 0; and otherwise H(x) is not defined. Note that in the
second case x may lie outside the domain of Gj for some (or even all) j 6= i.
One interpretation of this expression, which we use in Section 4, is as follows. The function H
is some test for x, and the Gi are sub-tests, which check for different possibilities of how H can
fail. Thus, a positive input must satisfy all the sub-tests, whereas a negative x has to fail at least
one sub-test Gi but might give an ambiguous answer on other tests Gj .
Classically, the above is a non-issue, since we can always apply the algorithm for Gi on an
input x, even if that input is outside the domain of Gi—the algorithm’s output must still be either
0 or 1. Quantumly, the situation is more delicate: strictly speaking, we cannot apply the textbook
Grover search to evaluate H since the oracle in the definition of a quantum query algorithm is
supposed to apply either I or −I on each input, but a quantum algorithm for Gi on an input x
outside its domain may apply an arbitrary unitary transformation on its entire working space.
In this particular case, H can be evaluated using amplitude amplification, Lemma 2.1, instead
of the usual Grover search. In Proposition 2.11 below, we extend this result to the case when the
conjunction is replaced by an arbitrary partial Boolean function F . Additionally, we show how to
generalize the tight composition result, Corollary 2.7, to this more general setting. In order to do
this, we have to make a number of definitions.
Definition 2.8 (Irrelevant variables). Let F : D → {0, 1} be a partial Boolean function with the
domain D ⊆ {0, 1}n. For each input x ∈ D, some input variables j ∈ [n] may be called irrelevant,
the remaining variables called relevant. This can be done in an arbitrary way, as long as the
following consistency condition is satisfied: for any x, y ∈ D such that F (x) 6= F (y), there must
exist a variable j relevant to both x and y and such that xj 6= yj .
Definition 2.9 (Evaluation with irrelevant variables). Evaluation of the function F with irrelevant
variables is defined as in Section 2.1, with the difference that, for an input z ∈ D, the input oracle
may malfunction on irrelevant variables, i.e., Oz,j in (2) may be an arbitrary unitary if j is irrelevant
for z.
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Definition 2.10 (Composition with irrelevant variables). The composition F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn) with
irrelevant variables is defined as in (4) but on a larger domain. Namely, the right-hand side of (4) is
defined iff there exists z ∈ D such that zj = Gj(xj1, . . . , xjmj ) for all relevant j. In particular, the
value of Gj(xj1, . . . , xjmj ) need not be defined for irrelevant j. The value of the composed function
on this input is then set to F (z), and does not depend on the particular choice of z.
We use the last two definitions as follows. Definition 2.10 is used in Section 4 to get a query-
efficient algorithm for testing juntas, using Corollary 2.12 below. Thus we save a logarithmic
factor, as described after Corollary 2.7. Definition 2.9 is used in Section 5 to get a time-efficient
implementation of the algorithm from Section 4 (again, see the discussion after Corollary 2.7).
The following proposition is a special case of the construction in [11].
Proposition 2.11. Let (Xj) be a feasible solution to the adversary bound (3) with objective value T .
Call an input variable j is irrelevant for an input z ∈ D iff Xj [[z, z]] = 0. With this choice of
irrelevant variables,
(a) There exists a quantum algorithm that evaluates the function F in the sense of Definition 2.9,
using O(T ) queries.
(b) For arbitrary partial Boolean functions Gj, we have
ADV±
(
F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn)
) ≤ T max
j∈[n]
ADV±(Gj),
where F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn) is as in Definition 2.10.
It is easy to see that this choice of irrelevant variables satisfies the consistency condition of
Definition 2.8. Indeed, if F (x) 6= F (y), then (3b) implies the existence of j with Xj [[x, y]] 6= 0, and
since Xj  0, both Xj [[x, x]] and Xj [[y, y]] are non-zero.
The proof of point (a) is analogous to the proof of the upper bound of Theorem 2.4, and we will
skip the details here. However, we will prove in Section 5.1 that our time-efficient implementation
of the corresponding solution to the adversary bound has this property.
We give a short proof of point (b) in Appendix A. Point (b) immediately gives the following
variant of Corollary 2.7.
Corollary 2.12. Let (Xj) be a feasible solution to the adversary bound (3) with objective value T .
We say that an input variable j is irrelevant for an input z ∈ D iff Xj [[z, z]] = 0. For arbitrary
partial Boolean functions Gj, we have
Q
(
F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn)
)
= O
(
T max
j∈[n]
Q(Gj)
)
,
with the composition as in Definition 2.10 with this choice of irrelevant variables.
Example 2.13 (AND). Let us return to the example in (5). Consider the AND function on the
domain D = {z ∈ {0, 1}n | |z| ≥ n−1}, where |z| is the Hamming weight. A feasible solution to (3)
for this function is given by Xj = ψjψ
∗
j , where ψj ∈ RD is given by
ψj [[z]] =

n−1/4, if |z| = n;
n1/4, if |z| = n− 1 and zj = 0;
0, if |z| = n− 1 and zj = 1.
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The objective value of this solution is
√
n. Note that if |z| = n− 1, then any variable j with zj = 1
is irrelevant for this input. This coincides with our definition of the “robust conjunction” at the
beginning of this section.
2.4 Fourier analysis
We use Fourier analysis for arbitrary real-valued functions f : {0, 1}n → R. If f is Boolean, it is
usually convenient to assume that its range is {±1} = {1,−1} rather than {0,1}. For a string
s ∈ {0, 1}n, the corresponding character is a Boolean function χs : {0, 1}n → {±1} defined by
χs(x) = (−1)s·x, where s · x =
∑
j sjxj denotes the inner product of s and x. We will often use the
corresponding subset S ⊆ [n] instead of a string s ∈ {0, 1}n.
Every function f : {0, 1}n → R, has a Fourier decomposition as follows:
f(x) =
∑
s∈{0,1}n
f̂(s)χs(x),
where f̂(s) = 2−n
∑
x f(x)χs(x) is the Fourier coefficient. The set
{
s | f̂(s) 6= 0} is called the
(Fourier) spectrum of f . Parseval’s identity says that rhis transformation respects the norm:
Ex
[
f(x)2
]
=
∑
s f̂(s)
2. In particular, for a Boolean f : {0, 1}n → {±1}, we have ∑s f̂(s)2 = 1.
For a subset S ⊆ [n], we define the influence of S on f by
InfS(f) =
∑
T : T∩S 6=∅
f̂(T )2. (6)
If S consists of a single element j ∈ [n] we write Infj(f), which is
∑
T : j∈T f̂(T )
2.
An alternative (but equivalent) definition of influence for functions with range {±1} is as follows.
Consider the following randomized procedure. Generate x ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random. Obtain
y ∈ {0, 1}n from x by replacing, for each j ∈ S, xj by an independent uniformly random bit. Then,
the influence InfS(f) is precisely twice the probability that f(x) 6= f(y). Note that the influence
Infj(f) equals the probability that f(x) 6= f(x⊕j) when x is sampled from {0, 1}n uniformly at
random, where x⊕j denotes x with the jth bit flipped. We repeatedly use the following two obvious
properties of influence:
• Monotonicity. If S ⊆ T , then InfS(f) ≤ InfT (f).
• Subadditivity. InfS∪T (f) ≤ InfS(f) + InfT (f) for all S, T ⊆ [n].
The following lemma from [4] (implicit in the proof of their Theorem III.3) explains why influence
is important in our junta testing algorithm.
Lemma 2.14. If f is ε-far from any k-junta, then for all W ⊆ [n] of size |W | ≤ k we have
Inf [n]\W (f) ≥ ε.
Proof. Define a (not necessarily Boolean) function g : {0, 1}n → R by g(x) = ∑S⊆W f̂(S)χS(x).
Let h be the Boolean function that is the sign of g. This h only depends on the variables in W , so
it is a k-junta. Since f is ε-far from any k-junta, we have (using Parseval’s identity)
ε ≤
∣∣{x | f(x) 6= h(x)}∣∣
2n
≤ E
x
[
(f(x)− g(x))2] = ∑
S
(f̂(S)− ĝ(S))2 =
∑
S 6⊆W
f̂(S)2.
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3 Gap version of group testing
Our junta testers, which we describe in the next section, work by generating a random subset
S ⊆ [n] and testing whether it intersects the set of influential variables of f . In this section
we study a more abstract problem, where we assume that we have an oracle that answers this
intersection-question with certainty. We believe this problem is of independent interest.
For each A ⊆ [n], define the function IntersectsA : 2[n] → {0, 1} by
IntersectsA(S) =
{
1, if A ∩ S 6= ∅;
0, otherwise.
(7)
In the standard version of group testing [31] one is given oracle access to the function IntersectsA
for some A with |A| ≤ k, and the task is to identify A. A natural variant of this problem is
to compute or approximate the cardinality of A (a task already considered in the group testing
literature [29]), and a decision version of the latter is deciding whether that cardinality is k or k+d
for some d, k ≥ 1. We define this formally next.
Definition 3.1 (EGGT). Let k and d be positive integers, X consist of all subsets of [n] having
size exactly k, and Y consist of all subsets of [n] having size exactly k+ d. In the exact gap version
of the group testing (EGGT) problem with parameters k and d, one is given oracle access to the
function IntersectsA with A ∈ X ∪ Y, and the task is to decide whether A ∈ X or A ∈ Y.
We also study a relaxation of EGGT, in which we allow “false negatives” in the small-set case
and “false positives” in the large-set case. This will be convenient for our applications. Luckily,
algorithms for solving EGGT often turn out to also solve this harder problem.
Definition 3.2 (GGT). Let k and d be positive integers. Define two families of functions
X˜ =
{
f : 2[n] → {0, 1} ∣∣ ∃A ∈ X ∀S ⊆ [n] : S ∩A = ∅ =⇒ f(S) = 0} (8)
and
Y˜ =
{
f : 2[n] → {0, 1} ∣∣ ∃B ∈ Y ∀S ⊆ [n] : S ∩B 6= ∅ =⇒ f(S) = 1} . (9)
In the gap version of the group testing (GGT) problem with parameters k and d, one is given oracle
access to f ∈ X˜ ∪ Y˜, and the task is to decide whether f ∈ X˜ or f ∈ Y˜.
It is easy to see that EGGT is a special case of the GGT, where the implications in (8) and (9)
are replaced by equivalences. The GGT problem also includes as a special case the problem of
distinguishing a function IntersectsA(f) with |A| ≤ k from a function IntersectsA(f) with |A| ≥
k + d.
3.1 Randomized complexity
In this section we show that the randomized query complexity of the gap version of group testing
is Θ˜
(
min{k, 1 + (k/d)2}).
The upper bound already follows from the existing literature on group testing: an O
(
1+(k/d)2
)
bound appears in [25] (with a surprisingly elaborate analysis) and an O
(
k log k
)
bound appears
in [24] and independently in [33, Section 5.3]. Strictly speaking those results only apply to the
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EGGT problem. Because of that, and also for completeness, we include in Section 3.1.1 an upper
bound for the more general GGT problem.
The only lower bound for randomized complexity that we are aware of is Ω(k) for the special case
d = 1 due to Garc´ıa-Soriano [33, Section 5.3], who calls the problem “relaxed group testing.” We
give two different lower bound proofs here for the general case of arbitrary d. The first (Section 3.1.2)
is a short reduction from the Gap Hamming Distance problem in communication complexity which
applies only to GGT. The second (Section 3.1.3) is a substantially longer but self-contained proof
which applies to EGGT as well.
3.1.1 Upper bound
Theorem 3.3. For any k, d ≥ 1, the randomized query complexity of the GGT problem with
parameters k and d is O
(
min{k log k, 1 + (k/d)2}).
Proof. We start with the easier upper bound of O
(
1 + (k/d)2
)
. Take S ⊆ [n] by including each
element independently at random with probability 1/k. If we are in the “small” case of GGT (as
in (8)), the probability of f(S) = 1 is at most 1− (1− 1/k)k. If, on the other hand, we are in the
“large” case of GGT (as in (9)) then that probability is at least 1 − (1 − 1/k)k+d. As these two
probabilities differ by Ω(min{1, d/k}), by a Chernoff bound, we can distinguish the two cases by
repeating this procedure O
(
1 + (k/d)2
)
times.
We now prove the upper bound O
(
k log k
)
. The algorithm maintains a partition of [n], initially
set to the trivial partition {[n]}. Each set in the partition can be either active or inactive, with the
initial set [n] being active. We maintain the invariant that for all sets S in the partition, f(S) = 1.
(We can assume f([n]) = 1 as otherwise we are clearly in the “small” case.) At each step of the
algorithm, we take an active set S in the partition and repeat the following 10 log k times. We
partition S into S1 and S2 by taking each element of S independently to be in either S1 or S2 with
probability 1/2. We then query f on both S1 and S2. If f returns 1 on both, then we replace S
with S1 and S2, and this ends the loop for S. Otherwise, if we did not manage to split S after
10 log k attempts, we declare S to be inactive and move on to another set in the partition. If at
any point the partition contains at least k + 1 sets we stop and output “large.” Otherwise, if all
(at most k) sets are inactive, we stop and output “small.”
Notice that after each step we either add a set to the partition or declare a set inactive. There
can therefore be at most 2k steps, and since each step involves at most 10 log k queries, the total
number of queries is at most 20k log k. The correctness in the “small” case is immediate from our
invariant: the only way for the algorithm to output “large” is if there are k+ 1 sets in the partition
on which f returns 1 but this cannot happen in the small case. So consider the “large” case as
in (9) with some set B of size at least k + 1. We claim that with high probability, all inactive
sets intersect B in at most 1 element, and hence it cannot happen that there are at most k sets in
the partition and all are inactive. To see why, notice that if a set S intersects B in at least two
elements, then there is probability 1/2 that when we split S into S1 and S2, these two elements
would end up in a different set. In this case f must answer 1 on both S1 and S2 and S would be
split. Therefore the probability for such an S to become inactive is at most 2−10 log k = k−10, which
means that with high probability this bad event will never happen.
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3.1.2 Lower bound for GGT via communication complexity
Theorem 3.4. For any k, d ≥ 1, the randomized query complexity of the GGT problem with
parameters k and d is Ω˜
(
min{k, 1 + (k/d)2}).
Proof. Following the general approach to classical testing lower bounds of Blais et al. [18], we will
show a reduction from the Gap Hamming Distance (GHD) problem in communication complexity.
In this problem there are two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice receives a bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n and
Bob receives a bit string y ∈ {0, 1}n. Their goal is to decide if the Hamming weight of x⊕ y (i.e.,
the Hamming distance between x and y) is greater than n/2+g or at most n/2−g (and can behave
arbitrarily for values in between). They are allowed the use of shared randomness and, for each
input (x, y), need to output the correct answer with probability, say, at least 2/3. It was shown
in [23] (see also [52]) that for any 1 ≤ g < n/2, any protocol solving this problem must use at least
Ω(min{n, n2/g2}) bits of communication (and this is tight).
Now let k, d ≥ 1. It clearly suffices to prove the theorem for d < k, so assume that this
is the case. The result now follows from the observation that any algorithm solving GGT with
parameters k and d making q ≤ k queries implies a protocol for GHD with parameters n = 2k and
g = d using O(q log k) bits of communication. In this protocol, Alice and Bob simulate the GGT
algorithm given oracle access to IntersectsA where A ⊆ [n] is the support of x⊕y, using their shared
randomness as coins to the algorithm. Whenever the algorithm performs a query S, Alice and Bob
compute IntersectsA(S) by running an Equality protocol with error probability less than 1/(10k)
and communication O(log k) (see [42, Example 3.13]) to check if the restrictions of x and y to S
are identical. It remains to notice that if the Hamming weight of x⊕ y is at most n/2− g = k− d,
then IntersectsA ∈ X˜ , whereas if it is greater than n/2 + g = k + d, then IntersectsA ∈ Y˜.
3.1.3 Direct lower bound for EGGT
Theorem 3.5. For any k, d ≥ 1, the randomized query complexity of the EGGT problem with
parameters k and d is Ω˜
(
min{k, 1 + (k/d)2}).
Proof. We apply Yao’s principle. Let X and Y be the uniform probability distributions over all
subsets of [n] of sizes k and k+ d, respectively, and D be the uniform mixture of X and Y. Denote
m = min
{bn/4c , ⌊n(k + d)/d2⌋}. Assume that T is a deterministic decision tree of depth less than
m/(4nk ln k). We prove that, if n is large enough, the total variation distance between the outputs
of T on X and Y is at most 1− Ω(1). As the success probability of a randomized algorithm with
error probability ≤ 1/3 can be amplified to be larger than that same 1−Ω(1) in a constant number
of repetitions, the theorem follows.
The main idea of the proof is this. We first show in Lemma 3.6 that queries to subsets of
cardinality larger than 4nk ln k are going to return 1 with very high probability. As a result, such
queries are useless and we can avoid them altogether, resulting in a decision tree T ′ in which all
queries are to subsets of size at most 4nk ln k. We then complete the proof by showing that since
T ′ looks at no more than m elements of the universe [n], it cannot distinguish X and Y with high
probability.
Let us introduce some notation. Each vertex V of a deterministic decision tree T is characterized
by its query SV ⊆ [n]. If V is at depth t − 1, let V1, . . . ,Vt be the vertices on the path from the
root to V, with V1 being the root and Vt = V. For i ∈ [t − 1], let Si be the corresponding query
and bi ∈ {0, 1} be the output of the oracle that leads from Vi to Vi+1. We say that the vertex
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V is used on an input A ⊆ [n] if it is visited when applying the decision tree, i.e., if and only if
IntersectsA(Si) = bi for all i ∈ [t − 1]. Finally, the set of fresh variables queried by a vertex V
consists of those variables not queried by its ancestors, namely, FV = SV \
⋃
i∈[t−1] Si.
Lemma 3.6. For any decision tree T of depth T ≤ k/2, there exists a decision tree T ′ of the same
depth such that
• for any vertex V of T ′, the set of fresh variables, FV , is of size at most 4nk ln k; and
• the probability that T and T ′ disagree on A ∼ D is at most 1/k.
Proof. Consider a sequence of decision trees
T0 = T , T1, . . . , TT−1, TT = T ′
defined in the following way. Assume that Tt−1 is already defined. For any vertex V of Tt−1 at
depth t− 1 such that |FV | ≥ 4nk ln k, replace it by a dummy query that always returns 1. It is clear
that T ′ satisfies the first requirement. From Claim 3.7 below, it follows that the probability that
Tt−1 and Tt disagree on A ∼ D is at most 1/k2. As T ≤ k/2, it follows by a union bound that T ′
satisfies the second requirement as well.
Claim 3.7. Assume that V is a vertex of Tt−1 at depth t− 1. If |FV | ≥ 4nk ln k, then Pr
[
A ∩ SV =
∅ | V used on A] ≤ 1/k2.
Proof. Let Si and bi be defined as above the statement of Lemma 3.6. Let P = {i | bi = 1} be the
locations where the path expects an answer 1 from the oracle. For each A on which V is used and
each i ∈ P , define hi(A) ∈ [n] as the minimal element of A ∩ Si.
Assume that (ci)i∈P is some possible list of the values of hi(A) (attained for at least one A).
Notice that if A is chosen from X and we condition on V being used, and on hi(A) = ci for all
i ∈ P , then the distribution of A is uniform over all sets of the form C ∪B where
C = {ci}i∈P ,
and B is a subset of [n] \D of cardinality k − |C| for
D =
{
j ∈ [n] ∣∣ ∃i : (bi = 0 ∧ j ∈ Si) ∨ (bi = 1 ∧ j ∈ Si ∧ j ≤ ci)} .
Therefore, under the same conditional distribution, we have
Pr
[
A ∩ SV = ∅
] ≤ Pr[A ∩ FV = ∅] = (n− |D| − |FV |
k − |C|
)/(
n− |D|
k − |C|
)
≤
(
1− |FV |
n
)k−|C|
≤
(
1− 4 ln k
k
)k/2
≤ e−2 ln k = 1/k2
where we used |C| ≤ |P | ≤ k/2. The case A ∈ Y is similar, and we get the same upper bound. As
the conditional probability is at most 1/k2 in all possible cases, the probability in the statement of
the lemma is also at most 1/k2.
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Therefore, in order to complete the proof of the theorem, it suffices to show that the total
variation distance between the output distributions of T ′ on X and on Y is 1− Ω(1). Notice that
since the depth of T ′ is at most m/(4nk ln k) and since each query is to a subset of cardinality at
most 4nk ln k, the total number of elements of the universe [n] “addressed” by T ′ is at most m. It
therefore suffices to prove the following stronger statement. For any deterministic decision tree B
of depth at most m that makes queries of the form j ∈? A, the total variation distance between the
output distributions of B on X and on Y is at most 1− Ω(1).
To show this, we first claim that due to the strong symmetry properties of X and Y, we can
assume without loss of generality that for all j, all vertices of B at depth j − 1 perform a query
on element j. Indeed, we can obviously assume that the queries along each path from the root
to a leaf are distinct. Therefore, by applying a permutation on the universe [n], we can ensure
that the query at the root is 1 and all other vertices perform queries in {2, . . . , n}. Crucially, this
permutation leaves both X and Y invariant. Similarly, we can now recur on each subtree of the
root, and perform a permutation so as to make both vertices at depth 1 query the element 2. Since
X is invariant under permutations of {2, . . . , n}, both when conditioned on containing 1 and on not
containing 1, and similarly for Y, this modification again does not affect the output distribution.
Continuing in the same fashion we obtain the claim.
As a result, we obtain that B depends only on A∩{1, . . . ,m}. Since the distribution of the latter
when A is chosen from X and from Y is symmetric, it is enough to show that the total variation
distance between the distribution of |A∩{1, . . . ,m}| when A is chosen from X and that distribution
when A is chosen from Y, is 1−Ω(1). This is shown in the following technical claim, for which we
observe that the former distribution is precisely the hypergeometric distribution Hn(k,m) and the
latter distribution is Hn(k + d,m).
Claim 3.8. For all integers k, d > 1, there exists N such that, for all n > N , the total variation
distance between Hn(k,m) and Hn(k + d,m) is 1− Ω(1), where m = min
{bn/4c , ⌊n(k + d)/d2⌋}.
Proof. Let p = min
{
1/4, (k + d)/d2
}
. As is well known, Hn(k, bpnc) converges to the binomial
distribution B(k, p) as n → ∞. Thus, it suffices to estimate the total variation distance between
B(k, p) and B(k + d, p).
If d > k, then Pr
[B(d, p) = 0] ≥ (1− 2/d)d ≥ e−2/2 for large enough d. Conditioned on
the event that the last d out of k + d coin flips in B(k + d, p) are 0 the two distributions B(k, p)
and B(k + d, p) become the same, hence the total variation distance between the (unconditioned)
distributions B(k, p) and B(k + d, p) is at most 1−Ω(1). Thus we may further assume that d ≤ k.
Next,
Pr
[B(k, p) = `]
Pr
[B(k + d, p) = `] = (1− p)−d k(k − 1) · · · (k − `+ 1)(k + d)(k + d− 1) · · · (k + d− `+ 1)
is a non-increasing function in `, hence, the total variation distance between B(k, p) and B(k+d, p)
is equal to the Kolmogorov distance between the two:
max
`
∣∣∣Pr[B(k + d, p) ≥ `]− Pr[B(k, p) ≥ `]∣∣∣ . (10)
Let ` be the value for which the maximum in (10) in attained. There are two cases. First, if
` > d(k + d)pe, then
Pr
[B(k, p) ≥ `] ≤ Pr[B(k + d, p) ≥ `] ≤ 1
2
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using the expression for the median of the binomial distribution [38], hence (10) is at most 1/2.
The second case is where ` ≤ d(k + d)pe. Defining `′ = min{k, kp + 3√kp(1− p)} and noting
that ` ≤ `′, we have that
Pr
[B(k + d, p) ≥ `] ≥ Pr[B(k, p) ≥ `] ≥ Pr[B(k, p) ≥ `′] = Ω(1) ,
where the last equality follows from Slud’s inequality [53] (which applies here due to our choice of
`′ and since p ≤ 1/4). Again, it follows that (10) is at most 1− Ω(1).
3.2 Quantum complexity
The aim of this section is to show that the quantum query complexity of the EGGTproblem is
Θ
(
1 +
√
k/d
)
. Thus, when
√
k ≤ d ≤ k, the quantum algorithm provides a quartic improvement
over the randomized one. We start with a lower bound for EGGT, which implies the same lower
bound for GGT.
Proposition 3.9. The quantum query complexity of the EGGT problem with parameters k and d
is Ω(1 +
√
k/d).
Proof. Take n = k+d. In this case Y contains only one element, namely [n], and the corresponding
function takes value 1 on every S except S = ∅. Intuitively, one detects that A ∈ X by finding an
i 6∈ A, so the problem becomes the unstructured search problem of size n, where the d elements of
[n] \A are marked. Unstructured search requires Ω(√n/d) queries [19].
This intuitive argument can be made rigorous via the unweighted adversary lower bound (The-
orem 2.5). We put the one input in Y in relation with all (nk) inputs in X , so m = 1 and m′ = (nk).
For each fixed nonempty S ⊆ [n], there are (n−|S|k ) different A ∈ ([n]k ) such that A∩S = ∅ (these are
the A ∈ X where a query to S returns value 0, showing that A 6= [n]). This number is maximized
for |S| = 1, so `′ ≤ (n−1k ) (and ` = 1). The lower bound from Theorem 2.5 is
Ω
(√
mm′
``′
)
= Ω
(√(
n
k
)/(
n− 1
k
))
= Ω
(√
n/d
)
= Ω(1 +
√
k/d).
The remaining part of this section is devoted to showing a matching upper bound on the
quantum query complexity. In Section 5 we will show how to implement this algorithm time-
efficiently.
Theorem 3.10. There exists a quantum algorithm that solves the EGGT problem with parameters
k and d using O
(√
1 + k/d
)
queries.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing a feasible solution to the semidefinite program (3)
and then applying Theorem 2.4. For the EGGT problem, the adversary bound reads as follows:
minimize max
A∈X∪Y
∑
S⊆[n]XS [[A,A]] (11a)
subject to
∑
S : A∩S=∅ xor B∩S=∅
XS [[A,B]] = 1 for all A ∈ X and B ∈ Y; (11b)
XS  0 for all S ⊆ [n]. (11c)
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Our feasible solution to (11) is an adaptation of the solution given in [10] for the task of finding
the subset A. It is possible to give a solution to (11) in the style of [10]. However, below we give a
more direct construction resulting in matrices XS of rank 1.
Clearly, we may assume that n ≥ k+ d. Let S ⊆ [n], and s = |S|. If s = 0 or s > n− k− d+ 1,
we define XS = 0. If 1 ≤ s ≤ n− k − d+ 1, we define XS = ψψ∗, where ψ is a vector indexed by
sets A ∈ X ∪ Y with entries
ψ[[A]] =

αs, if A ∈ X and A ∩ S = ∅;
βs, if A ∈ Y and |A ∩ S| = 1;
0, otherwise.
(12)
Here αs and βs are some positive real numbers satisfying
αsβs =
(
(n− k)
(
n− k − 1
s− 1
))−1
. (13)
The values of αs and βs depend on d and will be chosen later in order to minimize the value of the
objective function (11a). Thus, ignoring repeated and zero entries, XS is essentially a 2× 2 block
matrix of the form
XS =
(
α2s αsβs
αsβs β
2
s
)
.
The proof now follows from the two claims below.
Claim 3.11. The matrices XS form a feasible solution to (11b) for the EGGT problem and any
value of d.
Proof. Fix A ∈ X , B ∈ Y, and let ` = |B \ A| ≥ d. Note that XS [[A,B]] = 0 if the condition on S
in the sum in (11b) is not satisfied. Next,
∑
S⊆[n]
XS [[A,B]] =
1
n− k
n−k−`+1∑
s=1
`
(
n−k−`
s−1
)(
n−k−1
s−1
) = `
n− k T (n− k − `, n− k − 1) ,
where, for non-negative integers a ≤ b, we define
T (a, b) = 1 +
a
b
+
a(a− 1)
b(b− 1) + · · ·+
a(a− 1)(a− 2) · · · 1
b(b− 1)(b− 2) · · · (b− a+ 1) .
Thus, to show that
∑
S⊆[n]XS [[A,B]] = 1 it remains to show that T (a, b) = (b+1)/(b−a+1). This
is easy to check by induction on a: the case a = 0 is trivial, and for the inductive step we have
T (a, b) = 1 +
a
b
T (a− 1, b− 1) = 1 + a
b
(
b
b− a+ 1
)
=
b+ 1
b− a+ 1 .
Claim 3.12. For each d, there exists a choice of αs and βs satisfying (13) such that the objective
value (11a) is O(
√
1 + k/d).
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Proof. Fix a positive integer s ≤ n− k − d+ 1. For all A ∈ X and B ∈ Y, we have∑
S⊆[n] : |S|=s
XS [[A,A]] =
(
n− k
s
)
α2s (14)
and ∑
S⊆[n] : |S|=s
XS [[B,B]] = (k + d)
(
n− k − d
s− 1
)
β2s . (15)
We take αs and βs so that the values of (14) and (15) are equal. In particular, they are equal
to their geometric mean, which, by (13), is√(
n−k
s
)
(k + d)
(
n−k−d
s−1
)
(n− k)(n−k−1s−1 ) ≤
√
k + d
s(n− k)
(
1− s− 1
n− k − 1
)d−1
, (16)
where we used that
(
n−k
s
)
= n−ks
(
n−k−1
s−1
)
and
(k + d)
(
n−k−d
s−1
)
(n− k)(n−k−1s−1 ) ≤ k + dn− k
(
n− k − s
n− k − 1
)d−1
=
k + d
n− k
(
1− s− 1
n− k − 1
)d−1
.
Let us denote m = n− k − 1. Using (16), we get that for all A ∈ X ∪ Y:
∑
S⊆[n]
XS [[A,A]] =
∑
S⊆[n] : |S|=1
XS [[A,A]] +
n−k−d+1∑
s=2
∑
S⊆[n] : |S|=s
XS [[A,A]]
≤
√
k + d
d
+
1
m
m+1∑
s=2
√
k + d
(s− 1)/m
(
1− s− 1
m
)d−1
≤
√
k + d
d
+
∫ 1
0
√
k + d
p
(1− p)d−1 dp
=
√
k + d
d
+
√
k + d B
(
1/2, (d+ 1)/2
)
= O
(√
k + d
d
)
,
where B stands for the beta function. Here, we substituted p = (s − 1)/m, used monotonicity of
the function p−1(1− p)d−1, and applied a well-known asymptotic for the beta function.
From (12) we have the following important observation.
Observation 3.13. The feasible solution to the adversary bound (11) constructed in the proof of
Theorem 3.10 has the following irrelevant variables in the sense of Proposition 2.11:
• If the input A is in X (i.e., |A| = k), an input variable S ⊆ [n] is irrelevant if S ∩A 6= ∅.
• If the input A is in Y (i.e., |A| = k+ d), an input variable S ⊆ [n] is irrelevant if |S ∩A| 6= 1.
This observation will be used in Section 4, when we compose the algorithm of this section with
an influence tester to get a query-efficient junta tester. In Section 5, we will show that the same
algorithm also solves the GGT problem.
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4 Quantum algorithm for junta testing
The aim of this section is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. There exists a bounded-error quantum tester that distinguishes k-juntas from func-
tions that are ε-far from any k-junta, with query complexity
O
(√
k/ε log k
)
.
Suppose f : {0, 1}n → {±1} depends on a set J ⊆ [n] of K variables. Thus, the promise is that
either f is a k-junta (K ≤ k), or f is ε-far from any k-junta (we will call such f a “non-junta” for
simplicity). The goal of the tester is to distinguish these two cases.
At the lowest level of our algorithm, there is the following subroutine.
Lemma 4.2 (Influence Tester). There exists an algorithm that, given a subset V ⊆ [n], accepts
with probability at least 0.9 if InfV (f) ≥ δ and rejects with certainty if InfV (f) = 0. The algorithm
uses O(
√
1/δ) queries and O(n/
√
δ) other elementary operations.
Proof. We pick x, y randomly as described in Section 2 below (6), and check if f(x) 6= f(y). By
applying amplitude amplification for O(1/
√
δ) rounds to amplify the basis states where f(x) 6= f(y),
we obtain the lemma.
The idea is to run the EGGT algorithm of Theorem 3.10 with the Influence Tester of Lemma 4.2
as the input oracle. The complication is that we do not know what value of δ we should specify:
the Fourier weight of a non-junta can be either concentrated on few (though more than k) variables
with large influence, or scattered over many variables with tiny influence, and these cases call for
different values of δ. We identify roughly log k different types of non-juntas, and design a separate
tester for each of them. A junta will be accepted (with high probability) by all of these testers,
whereas a non-junta will be rejected by at least one of them. The description is given in Algorithm 1,
followed by the definition of the different types of non-juntas.
Let us describe these types of non-juntas. For notational convenience, assume the first K
variables are the influential ones, ordered by influence (of course, the tester does not know this
order):
Inf1(f) ≥ Inf2(f) ≥ · · · ≥ InfK(f) > 0 = InfK+1(f) = · · · = Infn(f). (17)
Our tester does not know the number K − k of “extra” variables if f is far from any k-junta.
However, Lemma 2.14 implies that
Inf{k+1,...,K}(f) ≥ ε. (18)
Our tests are tailored to the following cases:
1.
∑200k
j=k+1 Infj(f) ≥ ε/2. This case is additionally split into blog(200k)c+ 1 subcases:∣∣∣∣{j ∈ [n] ∣∣∣ Infj(f) ≥ ε2`+3 log(400k)
}∣∣∣∣ ≥ k + 2`, where ` ∈ {0, . . . , blog(200k)c};
Such an f is of the first kind, for this value of `.
2.
∑200k
j=k+1 Infj(f) ≤ ε/2. Such an f is of the second kind.
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Algorithm 1 Quantum Junta Tester
Input: Integer k > 0, real 0 < ε < 1, and oracle access to f : {0, 1}n → {±1}
Output: Accepts if f is a k-junta; rejects if f is ε-far from any k-junta.
1. Accept if all of the following blog(200k)c + 2 testers accept, reject if at least one of them
rejects:
• Tester of the first kind with ` ∈ {0, . . . , blog(200k)c};
• Tester of the second kind.
Subroutine 1.1 Tester of the first kind
Input: Integer ` ≥ 0.
Output: Accepts if f is a k-junta, rejects if f is a non-junta of the first kind
with this value of `.
1. Run the EGGT algorithm of Theorem 3.10 with parameters k and d = 2` and the following
oracle:
• On input S ⊆ [n], run Influence Tester on V = S and δ = ε/(2`+3 log(400k)).
2. Accept if the EGGT algorithm accepts, otherwise reject.
Subroutine 1.2 Tester of the second kind
Output: Accepts if f is k-junta, rejects if f is a non-junta of the second kind.
1. Estimate the acceptance probability of the following subroutine with additive error .05:
• Generate V ⊆ [n] by adding each i to V with probability 1/k independently at random.
• Run Influence Tester with this choice of V and δ = ε/(4k).
2. Accept if the estimated acceptance probability is ≤ 0.8, otherwise reject.
Note that f may be a non-junta of the first kind for many different values of ` simultaneously;
an extreme example is if f is the n-bit parity function.
Lemma 4.3. Every non-junta f satisfies at least one of the cases above.
Proof. It is clear that any f satisfies the first or the second case above, so the only thing we need
to show is that the first case is fully covered by its blog(200k)c + 1 subcases. Assume f satisfies
the first case. Denote ε′ = ε/(8 log(400k)) and consider the following intervals, which together
partition the interval [0, 1]:
A∞ =
[
0,
ε′
2blog(200k)c
)
, A` =
[
ε′
2`
,
ε′
2`−1
)
, A0 =
[
ε′, 1
]
,
where ` runs from blog(200k)c to 1. Let
B` =
{
j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , 200k} | Infj(f) ∈ A`
}
.
Each j is included in exactly one of the B`. Let also W` =
∑
j∈B` Infj(f). Thus,
∑
`W` ≥ ε/2,
because we are in the first case. Next, W∞ < 200k · ε/(8 · 2blog(200k)c) ≤ ε/4. Thus, there exists
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` ∈ {0, . . . , blog(200k)c} such that W` ≥ ε/(4 log(400k)). Then, either ` = 0 and |B`| ≥ 1, or
|B`| ≥W`
/(
ε
2`+2 log(400k)
)
≥ 2` .
Also, all j ∈ B` satisfy Infj(f) ≥ ε/(2`+3 log(400k)). By (17), all j ∈ [k] also satisfy this inequality.
This means that f satisfies the first case with this value of `.
Lemma 4.4. For each ` ∈ {0, . . . , blog(200k)c}, Subroutine 1.1 accepts if f is a junta, and re-
jects if f is a non-junta of the first kind for this value of `. Its query complexity can be made
O(
√
(k/ε) log k).
Proof. The composition in Subroutine 1.1 is understood here in the sense of Definition 2.10 with
the functions F and G defined as follows.
The partial function F is the EGGT function from Definition 3.1. Given a function h : 2[n] →
{0, 1}, F (h) = 0 if h = IntersectsA with |A| = k, and F (h) = 1 if h = IntersectsA with |A| = k+ d,
where IntersectsA is defined in (7). In all other cases, the value F (h) is not defined.
For each S ⊆ [n], the partial function GS is as defined in Lemma 4.2. Given a total function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, define GS(f) = 0 if InfS(f) = 0 and GS(f) = 1 if InfS(f) ≥ δ. If 0 < InfS(f) <
δ, the value GS(f) is not defined.
The function evaluated in Subroutine 1.1 is the following restriction of the composed function
F ◦ (G∅, G{1}, G{2}, . . . , G[n]):
f 7→ F (G∅(f), G{1}(f), G{2}(f), . . . , G[n](f)),
where, as the arguments of F , we have all possible 2n functions GS . The composition here is
understood as in Definition 2.10 with the irrelevant variables of F given by Observation 3.13.
The query complexity of the subroutine can be computed using Corollary 2.12. The complexity
of the algorithm for F in Theorem 3.10 is O(
√
k/2`), as 2` = O(k). The quantum query complexity
of each GV is O(
√
(2`/ε) log k) by Lemma 4.2. Thus, the total query complexity of the subroutine
is O(
√
(k/ε) log k).
Let us prove the correctness of the subroutine. Assume f is a non-junta of the first kind with
this value of `. By definition, there exists A ⊆ [n] of size k+ d such that for all j ∈ A, Infj(f) ≥ δ.
As the influence is monotone in S, InfS(f) ≥ δ for all S that intersect A. By Observation 3.13, all
input variables S satisfying S ∩A = ∅ are irrelevant, hence the value of the composed function is 1
in this case.
On the other hand, if f is a junta, there exists A ⊆ [n] of size k such that for all S ⊆ [n]
satisfying S ∩ A = ∅, we have InfS(f) = 0. By Observation 3.13, all input variables S satisfying
S ∩A 6= ∅ are irrelevant, hence the value of the composed function is 0 in this case.
From the proof of Lemma 4.4, it is clear why we need a separate tester for the second case.
If 2` becomes ω(k), the complexity of Influence Tester still grows as O˜(2`/ε), whereas the EGGT
algorithm cannot use fewer than O(1) queries. Our second tester (Subroutine 1.2) does not use the
EGGT algorithm, and relies on more traditional means.
Lemma 4.5. Subroutine 1.2 accepts if f is a junta, and rejects if f is a non-junta of the second
kind. Its query complexity is O(
√
k/ε).
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Proof. The estimate of the query complexity of Subroutine 1.2 is straightforward. Let us prove
its correctness. We will show that the inner procedure has acceptance probability ≤ 0.75 if f is a
k-junta, and acceptance probability ≥ 0.85 if f satisfies the second case.
If f is a k-junta then the probability that the set V does not intersect with the set J of (at
most k) relevant variables is:
(1− 1/k)|J | ≥ (1− 1/k)k ≥ 1/4,
assuming k ≥ 2. If V and J are disjoint, then the algorithm always rejects, hence, the acceptance
probability is at most 0.75.
Now suppose f is a non-junta of the second kind. For notational convenience, we still assume
that the variables of f are ordered by decreasing influence as in (17). For j ∈ [n], let us define
Infj(f) =
{
0, if j ≤ 200k;∑
S : S∩{200k+1,...,j}={j} f̂(S)
2, otherwise.
For S ⊆ [n], define InfS(f) =
∑
j∈S Infj(f).
This quantity satisfies two important properties. First, 0 ≤ InfS(f) ≤ InfS(f) for all S ⊆ [n].
And second, it is additive is S, i.e., InfS∪T (f) = InfS(f) + InfT (f) for all disjoint S and T . Note
that InfS(f) is only subadditive in S.
Next, as f satisfies the second case, Infj(f) ≤ ε/(200k) for j > 200k. Hence, Infj(f) ≤ ε/(200k)
for all j ∈ [n]. Finally,
Inf [n](f) = Inf{200k+1,...,K}(f) ≥ Inf{k+1,...,K}(f)−
200k∑
j=k+1
Infj(f) ≥ ε
2
.
Consider the random variable InfV (f) where V is as in Subroutine 1.2. Its expectation is
µ = E[InfV (f)] =
1
k
Inf [n](f) ≥
ε
2k
,
and its variance is
σ2 = Var[InfV (f)] ≤
1
k
∑
j
Infj(f)
2 ≤ 1
k
max
j
Infj(f) · Inf [n](f) ≤
ε
200k
µ ≤ µ
2
100
.
Then, Chebyshev’s inequality implies
Pr
[
InfV (f) < ε/4k
] ≤ Pr[|InfV (f)− µ| ≥ µ/2] ≤ Pr[|InfV (f)− µ| ≥ 5σ] ≤ 152 = 0.04 .
Hence, with probability at least 0.96, we have InfV (f) ≥ InfV (f) ≥ ε/4k. If this is indeed the
case, the influence tester in Lemma 4.2 accepts with probability ≥ 0.9. Thus, the inner procedure
accepts with probability at least 0.96 · 0.9 > 0.85 if f satisfies the second case.
From Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5, it is easy to see that Algorithm 1 is correct. If f is a junta, then all of
the O(log k) subtesters accept. If f is a non-junta, then at least one of them rejects (and the output
of the remaining ones is not defined). Thus, our algorithm is of the “robust conjunction” from (5).
Hence, using Example 2.13 and Corollary 2.12, we get that the query complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O
(√
log k ·
√
(k/ε) log k
)
= O
(√
k/ε log k
)
.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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5 Efficient implementation
The main aim of this section is to prove that the algorithm from Theorem 3.10 can be implemented
time-efficiently. Here by “time” we mean the total number of gates the algorithm uses, both the
query-gates and all elementary quantum gates (from some arbitrary fixed universal set of gates)
used to implement the unitaries in between the queries.
Moreover, we will prove that our algorithm computes a function that has irrelevant variables
as specified by Observation 3.13. For clarity, we will now explicitly describe the problem which
arises from applying Definition 2.9 to the EGGT problem of Definition 3.1.
Definition 5.1 (QGGT). In the quantum gap group testing (QGGT) problem with parameters k
and d, one is given access to an oracle Of satisfying the following properties. The oracle Of acts
on two registers: the n-qubit input register I, and an arbitrary internal working register W. The
oracle is in the block-diagonal form Of =
⊕
S⊆{0,1}n Of,S , where Of,S is a unitary operator on W,
that gets invoked in Of when the value of the register I is S. We are promised that Of belongs to
one of the following two families:
X˜ = {Of ∣∣ ∃A ∈ X ∀S ⊆ [n] : S ∩A = ∅ =⇒ Of,S |0〉W = |0〉W} (19)
and5
Y˜ = {Of ∣∣ ∃B ∈ Y ∀S ⊆ [n] : S ∩B 6= ∅ =⇒ Of,S |0〉W = −|0〉W} . (20)
The task is to detect whether Of ∈ X˜ or Of ∈ Y˜.
Theorem 5.2. There exists a quantum algorithm that solves the QGGT problem with parameters
k and d in time O˜
(
n
√
1 + k/d
)
using O
(√
1 + k/d
)
queries.
The time complexity of the algorithm is roughly n times its query complexity; as mentioned in
the introduction, this is probably the best one can hope for.
Note that the QGGT problem incorporates the usual quantization of the GGT problem from
Definition 3.2, thus we have the following:
Corollary 5.3. There exists a quantum algorithm that solves the GGT problem with parameters k
and d in time O˜
(
n
√
1 + k/d
)
using O
(√
1 + k/d
)
queries.
However, the QGGT problem is more general than the GGT problem, the difference being that
Of,S may be an arbitrary unitary in W when the premises in (19) or (20) do not hold.
With Theorem 5.2 in hand, it is easy to show that Algorithm 1 can be implemented time-
efficiently as well, with a slight increase in the number of queries.
Theorem 5.4. There exists a bounded-error quantum tester that distinguishes k-juntas from func-
tions that are ε-far from any k-junta in time O˜
(
n
√
k/ε
)
using O˜
(√
k/ε
)
queries.
Proof. It is easy to see from the proof of Lemma 4.5 that the time complexity of Subroutine 1.2
is O˜
(
n
√
k/ε
)
. Unfortunately, it is hard to estimate the time complexity of the implementation
of Subroutine 1.1 in Lemma 4.4, because Lemma 4.4 invokes Proposition 2.11(b) to analyze the
composition of quantum algorithms (Proposition 2.11(b) upper bounds the query complexity of the
5One can also weaken the premise S ∩B 6= ∅ in (20) to |S ∩B| = 1. We chose this definition to make the QGGT
problem more similar to the GGT problem.
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composition but not its time complexity). However, Algorithm 1 can be implemented to have time
complexity O˜
(
n
√
k/ε
)
as follows.
We first reduce the error probability of each call to the Influence Tester of Lemma 4.2 to ε/k
by O(log kε ) repetitions, and run it backwards (after copying the answer) to set the workspace
back to its initial state; then run the QGGT algorithm on this oracle as if it’s errorless. Standard
techniques show that the resulting variant of Subroutine 1.1 can be made to have error probabil-
ity ≤ 1/3, and we do not need to invoke Proposition 2.11(b) anymore. The query complexity of
Subroutine 1.1 has now gone up by a factor O(log kε ), but its time complexity becomes O˜
(
n
√
k/ε
)
,
because it is the time complexity of the QGGT algorithm, plus its oracle-query complexity multi-
plied by the time complexity of the amplified Influence Tester of Lemma 4.2 that implements one
oracle call.
The resulting variant of Algorithm 1 can thus be implemented in time O˜
(
n
√
k/ε
)
.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.2
It remains to prove Theorem 5.2. This is done by a (by now relatively standard) implementation
of the dual adversary bound as in [48]. The analysis follows [43], with the simplification that we
have Boolean input and output (see also [9, Section 3.4]). Our main innovation here is an efficient
implementation of a specific reflection in Section 5.2, which we do by means of a new and efficient
quantum Fourier transform.
Recall the QGGT problem as defined in Definition 5.1. Before we proceed with the algorithm,
we have to make a minor modification to this definition. Due to technical reasons in Claim 5.5
below, we have to assume that Of,S not only satisfies (19) or (20), but is also a reflection. This
is without loss of generality. Indeed, assume Of satisfies the original constraints of Definition 5.1.
Add a new basis element |1〉 to W, and assume that Of,S does not change it. Let V be a unitary
on W that maps |0〉W to 1√2
(|0〉W + |1〉W). Denote by O′f the following chain of operations: apply
OfV , reflect about
1√
2
(|0〉W + |1〉W), and apply V −1O−1f . It is clearly a reflection, and it has the
same decomposition O′f =
⊕
S⊆{0,1}n O
′
f,S as Of does. Moreover, it is straightforward to check
that if Of is in X˜ or Y˜, then O′f is also in X˜ or Y˜, respectively.
Our algorithm only uses the input register I, so we omit this subscript below. The register W
is not written, but assumed to be in the state |0〉W. We also add a new basis state |0〉 to I, and
assume that Of |0〉 = −|0〉 for all Of .
The query-efficient algorithm in Theorem 3.10 was obtained by constructing the matrices XS
in (12) that depend on parameters αs and βs satisfying (13). The objective value (11a) is W =
O(
√
1 + k/d) by Claim 3.12. Also we define γ = C1
√
W for some constant C1 to be determined
later.
Let Λ be the projector onto the span of the vectors
ψA = |0〉+ γ
n−k−d+1∑
s=1
αs
∑
S⊆[n] : |S|=s, S∩A=∅
|S〉 (21)
over all A ∈ X , and RΛ = 2Λ− I be the corresponding reflection. (In Section 5.2 we show how to
implement RΛ efficiently.) The QGGT problem is solved by Algorithm 2, where C is some constant
to be defined later.
Claim 5.5. Algorithm 2 is correct.
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Algorithm 2 Quantum Algorithm for the QGGT problem
Input: access to an oracle Of ∈ X˜ ∪ Y˜ as in (19) or (20).
Accepts: iff Of ∈ X˜ .
1. Prepare the state |0〉.
2. Perform phase estimation on the operator U = OfRΛ with precision δ = 1/(CW ).
3. Accept if and only if the phase-estimate is greater than δ.
Proof. Let us first assume that Of ∈ Y˜. Let B ∈ Y be a corresponding element from (20), so
|B| = k + d. Define the following vector
u = γ|0〉 −
n−k−d+1∑
s=1
βs
∑
S⊆[n] : |S|=s, |S∩B|=1
|S〉. (22)
The squared norm of this vector is
‖u‖2 = γ2 +
n−k−d+1∑
s=1
(k + d)
(
n− k − d
s− 1
)
β2s = γ
2 +
∑
S⊆[n]
XS [[B,B]] ≤ C21W +W,
where the second equality uses (15), and the last inequality uses that the objective value (11a)
is W .
We now show that u is an eigenvector of U = OfRΛ with eigenvalue 1 (so the eigenvalue’s phase
is 0). First, Ofu = −u, because Of |S〉 = −|S〉 for all S occurring in (22) and we earlier already
assumed Of |0〉 = −|0〉. Second, for all A ∈ X we have
〈ψA, u〉 = γ − γ
n−k−d+1∑
s=1
∑
S⊆[n]:|S|=s,S∩A=∅,|S∩B|=1
αsβs = γ − γ
∑
S : A∩S=∅ xor B∩S=∅
XS [[A,B]] = 0,
where we used (12) and (11b). Hence, Λu = 0 and RΛu = (2Λ − I)u = −u. Therefore, Uu =
OfRΛu = u.
Furthermore, the inner product of the normalized eigenvector u/‖u‖ and |0〉 is
γ
‖u‖ ≥
C1
√
W√
C21W +W
=
1√
1 + 1/C21
,
which can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by setting C1 to a sufficiently large constant. Since |0〉
is the starting state of Algorithm 2, the algorithm will (with probability at least 2/3 if we set C1
appropriately) produce a phase estimate that is at most δ, and correctly rejects Of ∈ Y˜.
Now assume Of ∈ X˜ . Let A ∈ X be the corresponding element from (19), so |A| = k. In this
case, we will apply Lemma 2.3 with R1 = −RΛ = I − 2Λ, R2 = −Of (hence U = OfRΛ = R2R1),
Π1 = I − Λ, Π2 = (I − Of )/2, and w = ψA. Indeed, since Λw = w, w lies in the kernel of Π1,
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and we assume Of is a reflection, so the conditions of the lemma are satisfied. We have Π2w = |0〉
because Of |0〉 = −|0〉, and Of |S〉 = |S〉 for all S in the support of ψA. Also,
‖ψA‖2 = 1 + γ2
n−k−d+1∑
s=1
(
n− k
s
)
α2s = 1 + γ
2W = 1 + C21W
2.
Since also W = Ω(1), we have ‖w‖ = O(W ). Therefore, using Lemma 2.3, the algorithm’s initial
state |0〉 barely overlaps with eigenvectors of U = R2R1 whose phase is (2δ)-close to 0:
‖P2δ|0〉‖ = ‖P2δΠ2w‖ ≤ δ‖w‖ = O(1/C).
Hence the probability that phase estimation erroneously yields an estimate that is δ-close to 0 can
be made less than 1/3 by choosing C a sufficiently large constant. Then Algorithm 2 accepts all
Of ∈ X˜ with probability at least 2/3.
As RΛ can be implemented without executing the input oracle, the query complexity of Algo-
rithm 2 is O(W ) = O(
√
1 + k/d) by Theorem 2.2. To get the time complexity, the query complexity
has to be multiplied by the cost of implementing U = OfRΛ. In Section 5.2 we show that RΛ can
be implemented in time O˜(n). Thus, Algorithm 2 can be implemented in time O˜(n
√
1 + k/d).
5.2 Efficient implementation of RΛ
This section is devoted to the proof of the following lemma, which shows that the reflection RΛ =
2Λ − I can be implemented efficiently, in time O˜(n). For simplicity we assume n > 2k. This is
without loss of generality, as we can extend the set [n] with dummy elements. Next, we identify
|0〉 of Eq. (21) with |∅〉, and absorb γ into αs. To state the lemma, it is also more convenient to
replace A in Eq. (21) by its complement, T = [n] \A.
Lemma 5.6. Let α0, α1, . . . , αn−k be arbitrary complex numbers and let Λ be the projector onto
the span of the vectors
ψT =
n−k∑
`=0
α`
∑
B⊆T : |B|=`
|B〉
over all T ⊆ [n] with |T | = n − k. Then, the corresponding reflection RΛ = 2Λ − I can be
implemented in time O˜(n), up to an error in the operator norm that can be made smaller than any
inverse polynomial in n.
Representation theory background. In order to prove Lemma 5.6, we will use the structural
properties implied by the invariance of the vectors ψT under permutations of [n]. We need some
basic results from the representation theory of the symmetric group. These results are only used
in this section. The reader may refer to a textbook on the topic such as [50], or to the appendix
of [10], where we briefly formulate the required notions and results.
Let Sn denote the symmetric group on [n]. We consider (left) modules over the group algebra
CSn. We call them Sn-modules; they are also known as representations of Sn. There is a 1-1
correspondence between irreducible Sn-modules and partitions (t1, . . . , tk) of n (where t1 ≥ t2 ≥
· · · ≥ tk and t1 + t2 + · · ·+ tk = n). Irreducible Sn-modules are called Specht modules.
A linear mapping θ : V →W between two Sn-modules is called an Sn-homomorphism if, for all
pi ∈ Sn and v ∈ V , we have θ(piv) = pi(θ(v)). The following result is basic for such homomorphisms:
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Lemma 5.7 (Schur’s Lemma). Assume θ : V →W is an Sn-homomorphism between two irreducible
Sn-modules V and W . Then, θ = 0 if V and W are not isomorphic. Otherwise, θ is uniquely defined
up to a scalar multiplier.
Let M denote the complex vector space with the set of subsets of [n] as its orthonormal basis
and with the group action piA = pi(A), where pi ∈ Sn, A ⊆ [n], and pi(A) denotes the image of the
set A under the transformation pi. We call {A}A⊆[n] the standard basis of M .
The module M naturally decomposes into a direct sum M =
⊕n
`=0M`, where M` is spanned
by the subsets of cardinality `.6 The following lemma describes the decomposition of M` into
irreducible submodules S`(t) (for different values of t), which will be isomorphic to the Specht
module S(t) corresponding to the partition (n− t, t) of n.
In the formulation of the lemma and later we use ⊗ to denote disjoint union of subsets of [n],
extended by linearity, so for example ({1} − {2})⊗ ({3} − {4}) = {1, 3} − {1, 4} − {2, 3}+ {2, 4}.
Lemma 5.8. The Sn-module M` has the following decomposition into irreducible submodules: M` =⊕`′
t=0 S`(t), where `
′ = min{`, n− `}, and each S`(t) is isomorphic to S(t). The submodule S`(t) is
spanned by the vectors
v`(t, a, b) =
({a1} − {b1})⊗ · · · ⊗ ({at} − {bt})⊗ ( ∑
A⊆[n]\{a1,...,at,b1,...,bt} : |A|=`−t
A
)
(23)
defined by disjoint sequences a = (a1, . . . , at) and b = (b1, . . . , bt) of pairwise distinct elements
of [n]. The dimension of S(t) is
(
n
t
)− ( nt−1).
There is a unique (up to a scalar) Sn-isomorphism between S`(t) and Sm(t). We can choose the
scalar so that the isomorphism maps each vector v`(t, a, b) to the corresponding vm(t, a, b).
The lemma follows from general theory [50, Sections 2.9 and 2.10]. The Appendix of [10] contains
a short proof, see also Remark 5.12 below. Figure 1 depicts the different subspaces involved in the
decomposition of M .
S0(0)S1(0) · · · S`(0)R(0)
R(t)
...
...
...
· · · Sn(0)
R(n2 )
S`(t)· · · · · ·
...
Sn
2
(n2 )
...
...
M
0
M
1
M
`· · · · · · M
n
Figure 1: Decomposition of M
6 In terms of [50], M` is isomorphic to the permutation module corresponding to the partition (n − `′, `′) of n,
where `′ = min{`, n− `}.
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Let v˜`(t, a, b) denote the normalized vector v`(t, a, b)/‖v`(t, a, b)‖, that is
v`(t, a, b) =
√
2t
(
n− 2t
`− t
)
v˜`(t, a, b). (24)
Also, let ϑt→` : St(t) → S`(t) denote the isomorphism from Lemma 5.8 given by v˜t(t, a, b) 7→
v˜`(t, a, b). This is a unitary transformation.
For each t, we choose an orthonormal basis {et(t, x)}x of St(t). Also, let e`(t, x) = ϑt→` et(t, x),
so that {e`(t, x)}x is an orthonormal basis of S`(t). The precise choice of the basis of St(t) is irrele-
vant, but it is important that the bases of S`(t) for various ` are synchronized via the isomorphism
ϑt→`. The set {e`(t, x)}`,t,x forms an orthonormal basis of M , which we call the Fourier basis. Let
R(t) denote the submodule
⊕n−t
`=t S`(t) of M .
Claim 5.9. In the Fourier basis, any Sn-homomorphism from M to itself is of the form
⊕bn/2c
t=0 At⊗
IS(t), where At ⊗ IS(t) acts on R(t), At is an (n− 2t+ 1)× (n− 2t+ 1) matrix, and IS(t) denotes
the identity operator on S(t).
Proof. By Schur’s lemma, any Sn-homomorphism maps each irreducible module to an isomorphic
one. Hence, each R(t) is mapped to itself. Also, as ϑt→` is the only isomorphism between St(t) and
S`(t), we see by Schur’s lemma that a vector e`(t, x) is mapped into a linear combination of the
vectors {em(t, x)}m. Thus, in R(t), the homomorphism has the form At ⊗ IS(t) for some At.
The quantum Fourier transform of M . Let the register A have M as its vector space with
the standard basis. Let also T and L be (n+ 1)-qudits (i.e., registers of dimension n+ 1), and let
n-qubit register B store indices x of the Fourier basis elements e`(t, x). The Fourier transform of
M is the following unitary map, for which it is convenient to use ket notation:
F : |t〉T|`〉L|x〉B 7→ |e`(t, x)〉A. (25)
Note that while F is a unitary from a 2n-dimensional space to a 2n-dimensional space, it is conve-
nient to use more than n qubits to represent the basis states (namely n+ 2dlog(n+ 1)e qubits).
The Fourier transform segregates copies of non-isomorphic Specht modules of M by assigning
them different values of t in the register T. For each Specht module S(t), the copies are labeled
by `, which is the size (as a subset of [n]) of the standard basis elements of M used by the copy.
Finally, the basis elements of S(t) are indexed by x, the precise choice of which is irrelevant for our
application.7 The next theorem, which we prove in Section 5.3, shows our QFT can be implemented
efficiently.
Theorem 5.10. There exists a quantum algorithm with time complexity O˜(n) that implements the
map from (25) for all choices of t, ` and x for which the last expression is defined, up to an error
in the operator norm that can be made smaller than any inverse polynomial in n.
7For readers familiar with the usual formula of the QFT over Sn, given by |g〉 7→ ∑ρ√ dρ|G| |ρ〉∑i,j ρ(g)ij |i〉|j〉,
(where g ∈ Sn, ρ runs over all irreps of Sn, and dρ is the dimension of ρ): the register T in our algorithm is similar to
ρ, L is similar to i, and B to j. The formula, however, does not exactly apply in our case, because we are performing
QFT of the module M , not the regular Sn-module, for which the latter formula applies. In other words, our QFT acts
on the 2n-dimensional space spanned by the subsets of [n], not the n!-dimensional space spanned by all permutations.
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Decomposing Λ in terms of representations. The main observation behind our implementa-
tion of RΛ is that Λ is invariant under the permutation of elements, hence it is an Sn-homomorphism
from M to itself, and thus subject to the decomposition of Claim 5.9. In fact, it is not hard to
obtain the matrices At in this decomposition.
Claim 5.11. The image of Λ contains at most one copy of each S(t) for t = 0, . . . , k. In the
Fourier basis, Λ has the following form:
⊕k
t=0(w˜tw˜
∗
t )⊗ IS(t), where w˜t is the normalized version of
the (n− 2t+ 1)-dimensional vector wt that is given by
wt[[`]] = α`
(
n− `− t
k − t
)√(
n− 2t
`− t
)
, (26)
for ` ∈ {t, . . . , n−k}, and wt[[`]] = 0 for ` ∈ {n−k+1, . . . , n− t}. (If wt is the 0-vector, we assume
that w˜t is the 0-vector as well.)
Proof. We first assume that αn−k 6= 0. Because Λ is an Sn-homomorphism, by Claim 5.9, Λ has the
form
⊕
tAt⊗IS(t) in the Fourier basis. We claim that Λ contains exactly one copy of each S(t) with
0 ≤ t ≤ k, i.e., all At are rank-1 projectors: indeed, the projection of Λ on Mn−k is surjective, and
as we know from Lemma 5.8, the latter does contain a copy of each S(t). Since S(t) has dimension(
n
t
)−( nt−1), the direct sum of these copies of S(t) already has dimension ∑kt=0 ((nt)− ( nt−1)) = (nk).
On the other hand, Λ clearly has dimension at most
(
n
k
)
, hence Λ cannot contain more than one
copy of any of these S(t). Thus, Λ actually has the form
⊕k
t=0(w˜tw˜
∗
t )⊗ IS(t) for some vectors w˜t.
It remains to find the coefficients of w˜t. Take a vector vn−k(t, a, b) ∈Mn−k for some sequences
a and b, and act on it with the linear transformation that maps a basis vector T ∈ Mn−k to the
vector ψT ∈M . The resulting vector u is clearly in the image of Λ. We claim that
u =
n−k∑
`=t
α`
(
n− `− t
k − t
)
v`(t, a, b) =
n−k∑
`=t
α`
(
n− `− t
k − t
)√
2t
(
n− 2t
`− t
)
v˜`(t, a, b). (27)
To prove the first equality of (27), consider a basis element A ∈M` for an ` ∈ {t, . . . , n−k} and look
at its coefficient in u. If A contains both ai and bi for some i, it appears in none of the ψT of which
u consists. If A avoids both ai and bi for some i, then any coefficient it gets from ψT is cancelled
by the coefficient it gets from ψT4{ai,bi}, where 4 stands for symmetric difference. Finally, if A
uses exactly one of each ai, bi, it appears in ψT for
(
n−`−t
k−t
)
choices of T , with coefficient equal to
its coefficient in v`(t, a, b) times α` in each. This establishes the first equality of (27). The second
equality in (27) follows immediately from (24).
Now let v = (vx) be the vector of coefficients of the representation of v˜t(t, a, b) in the basis
{et(t, x)}x, i.e., v˜t(t, a, b) =
∑
x vxet(t, x) = F
(|t〉T|t〉L|v〉B). Then, by our choice of orthonormal
basis, F−1(v˜`(t, a, b)) = |t〉T|`〉L|v〉B for ` ∈ {t, . . . , n− k}, and from (27), we have
F−1
(
u/
√
2t
)
=
n−k∑
`=t
α`
(
n− `− t
k − t
)√(
n− 2t
`− t
)
F−1(v˜`(t, a, b)) = |t〉T|wt〉L|v〉B,
where wt is defined in (26). As u is in the image of Λ and F
−1u is u represented in the Fourier
basis, wt must be proportional to w˜t.
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Now consider the case αn−k = 0. In this case, change αn−k to an arbitrary non-zero value,
and perform the above calculations for the resulting projector Λ′. The result follows from the
observation that the image of Λ is a projection of the image of Λ′ onto
⊕
`<n−kM`.
Remark 5.12. Note that (27) essentially proves the second part of Lemma 5.8. Indeed, it shows
that the transformation vn−k(t, a, b) 7→ v`(t, a, b) is linear (which is not obvious from (23)). It is
clear that it is invariant under the action of Sn, hence, it is an isomorphism between the copies of
S(t) in Mn−k and M`.
Implementing RΛ. Having the efficient implementation of the QFT of Theorem 5.10 (proved in
the next section), it is straightforward to implement the translation RΛ up to polynomially small
error. First, we run the QFT of Theorem 5.10 in reverse, and obtain the representation of M in the
Fourier basis. In this basis, by Claim 5.11, our task boils down to the reflection about the vector w˜t
in the register L, where t is the value of the register T. We show how to implement this reflection
below. The register B is not used in this reflection. After that, we run the QFT of Theorem 5.10.
Reflection about w˜t. Reflection about w˜t is done using standard techniques. We describe the
transformation for a fixed t, but a key point is that they can all be done in superposition (conditioned
on t), so that the total time complexity of this step is the same as for a fixed value of t.
We may assume w˜t is a non-zero vector. To reflect about w˜t, it suffices to give an O˜(n)-time
unitary Ut that maps |t〉L to w˜t: the reflection about w˜t is then implemented by first applying U−1t ,
then reflecting about |t〉L (which is easy), and then applying Ut. To implement this map Ut, we
start in the state |t〉L, and run through all the values of ` from t to n − k. In the course of this
process, we gradually generate states of the form
w˜t[[t]] |t〉L + · · ·+ w˜t[[`− 1]] |`− 1〉L +
√
R |`〉L,
where R = 1 − ∑`−1i=t ∣∣w˜t[[i]]∣∣2 is the remaining weight to use. At each step, we perform the
transformation √
R |`〉L 7→ w˜t[[`]] |`〉L +
√
R′|`+ 1〉L, (28)
where R′ = 1−∑`i=t∣∣w˜t[[i]]∣∣2. To help with this, we keep two registers C and R. In C at step ` ≥ t,
we store the number
c` =
(
n−`−t
k−t
)√(
n−2t
`−t
)
‖wt‖
so that w˜t[[`]] = α`c` by (26). In the register R, we store R. Both are stored as floating point
real numbers with Θ(log n) bits of precision. With these values, and knowing α`, the transforma-
tion (28) is a routine polylogarithmic computation.
The registers C and R are manipulated as follows. We start by computing ‖wt‖ and then ct.
We then upload the precomputed value of ct into C, set ` = t and set R to 1. After each step (28)
we use
c`+1
c`
=
n− `− k√
(n− `− t)(`+ 1− t) ,
to replace c` with c`+1 in the register C, in polylogarithmic time. We also update R (in the
straightforward way). At the end, when ` = n− k, we uncompute the values of C and R.
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It suffices to keep track of c` up to A log n relative bits of precision, for an appropriate A.
This can be achieved as c` is only multiplied by a constant at each step, and is never added or
subtracted. Then, R is accurate within an absolute error of O(1/nA−1) (to perform the entire
reflection, we subtract O(n) values
∣∣w˜t[[i]]∣∣2 = (α`c`)2 from R, with absolute error O(1/nA) in each
of those values). This means that the transformation (28) produces amplitude for |`〉L that is within
O(1/nA−1) of the correct amplitude w˜t[[`]]. Since this is achieved for every ` and there are O(n)
values of `, the state that is produced by our algorithm is within Euclidean distance O(1/nA−3/2)
of the correct one. The error analysis for the computation of ‖wt‖ at the beginning of the algorithm
is similar.
Thus, each step takes time polylog(n), and there are O(n) steps in total. Computing ‖wt‖ and
ct at the beginning and removal of the final values of C and R at the end also takes time O˜(n). As
both applications of the QFT take time O˜(n) as well, the total running time of our implementation
of the reflection RΛ is O˜(n).
5.3 Quantum Fourier Transform of the module M
In this section, we prove Theorem 5.10. Our algorithm is essentially the same as the quantum
Schur-Weyl transform in [5, 6]. However, the algorithm in [5, 6] is defined for another group (a
product of a general linear group and a symmetric group), and we have to verify that the algorithm
really performs the transformation in (25). Therefore we will give a complete description of the
algorithm here.
We will define our algorithm inductively in n, so we add a superscript n to the notations of the
previous section in order to specify the value of n, e.g., Mn, Sn(t), vn` (t, a, b) and so on.
Basis for modules Snt (t). We now define the orthonormal basis {ent (t, x)}x of Snt (t), for all
n, t ∈ N such that n ≥ 2t. As in [5, 6, 39], our choice is a variant of the Gelfand-Tsetlin basis.
The index x is encoded as a binary string of length n (not all binary strings correspond to basis
elements though), and the definition of ent (t, x) is as follows.
First, we define en0 (0, 0
n) as the basis element ∅ of Sn0 (0). For t > 0, we define ent (t, x) in terms
of en−1t (t, x). For that, we first need to understand the interplay between Sn- and Sn−1-modules.
Since Sn−1 is a subgroup of Sn, we can look at the action of Sn−1 on Sn(t). Let Sn(t)↓Sn−1 denote
Sn(t), considered as an Sn−1-module. The branching rule [50, Section 2.8] says that Sn(t)↓Sn−1 is
Sn−1-isomorphic to the direct sum Sn−1(t)⊕ Sn−1(t− 1). (If n = 2t, the Sn−1(t) term is absent in
the last expression, as n− 1 < 2t.)
Let τ0 be the Sn−1-isomorphism between Sn−1t (t) and the copy of Sn−1(t) in Snt (t)↓Sn−1 , and
τ1 be the Sn−1-isomorphism between Sn−1t−1 (t − 1) and the copy of Sn−1(t − 1) in Snt (t)↓Sn−1 . We
normalize τ0 and τ1 so that they both become unitary operators. We define e
n
t (t, x0) = τ0e
n−1
t (t, x)
and ent (t, x1) = τ1e
n
t−1(t−1, x), where x runs through the basis elements of Sn−1t (t) and Sn−1t−1 (t−1),
respectively. Thus, {ent (t, x)}x is an orthonormal basis of Snt (t), because τ0 and τ1 are unitary, and
their images are orthogonal as vector spaces.
Let us describe the isomorphisms τ0 and τ1 explicitly. If n > 2t, the isomorphism τ0 is given
by v˜n−1t (t, a, b) 7→ v˜nt (t, a, b). It is more convenient to define τ1 as the Sn−1-isomorphism between
Sn−1t (t) and the copy of Sn−1(t) in Snt+1(t+ 1)↓Sn−1 . A non-normalized version of the isomorphism
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is given by
vn−1t (t, a, b) 7→
∑
i∈[n−1]\{a1,...,at,b1,...,bt}
({a1} − {b1})⊗ · · · ⊗ ({at} − {bt})⊗ ({i} − {n}). (29)
Indeed, this is a linear combination of linear transformations vn−1t (t, a, b) 7→ vn−1t+1 (t, a, b) and
vn−1t (t, a, b) 7→ vn−1t (t, a, b) ⊗ {n}. It is also clearly invariant under the action of Sn−1. τ1 is
the normalized version of this mapping, i.e., it maps v˜n−1t (t, a, b) into the normalized vector on the
right-hand side of (29).
Identity between basis elements. Recall that e`(t, x) = ϑt→` et(t, x), where ϑt→` is defined
after (24).
Claim 5.13. We have
en` (t, x0) =
√
n− `− t
n− 2t e
n−1
` (t, x) +
√
`− t
n− 2t e
n−1
`−1 (t, x)⊗ {n} (30)
and
en` (t+ 1, x1) =
√
`− t
n− 2t e
n−1
` (t, x)−
√
n− `− t
n− 2t e
n−1
`−1 (t, x)⊗ {n}, (31)
whenever the vectors on the left-hand side are defined. (If ` = 0, t = ` or n = t+ `, the right-hand
sides of (30) and (31) contain only one term.) Here we identify elements S ⊆ [n−1] of the standard
basis of Mn−1 with the corresponding basis elements of Mn.
Proof. To prove (30), it suffices to show that for any two disjoint sequences a = (a1, . . . , at) and
b = (b1, . . . , bt) of distinct elements of [n− 1], we have
v˜n` (t, a, b) =
√
n− `− t
n− 2t v˜
n−1
` (t, a, b) +
√
`− t
n− 2t v˜
n−1
`−1 (t, a, b)⊗ {n},
as (30) then follows by linearity. The latter equality follows from (23), as a uniformly random
(` − t)-subset A of [n] \ {a1, . . . , at, b1, . . . , bt} has probability (` − t)/(n − 2t) of including the
element n.
To prove (31), let us apply ϑnt+1→` to the right-hand side of (29). The resulting vector is
({a1}−{b1})⊗ · · ·⊗ ({at}−{bt})⊗((`− t) ∑
A⊆[n]\{a1,...,at,b1,...,bt}
|A|=`−t, n/∈A
A − (n− `− t)
∑
A⊆[n]\{a1,...,at,b1,...,bt}
|A|=`−t, n∈A
A
)
,
because each A 63 n appears once from each term i ∈ A of the sum in (29), and each A 3 n appears
once from each term i /∈ A. By an easy calculation, the normalized version of this vector is√
`− t
n− 2t v˜
n−1
` (t, a, b)−
√
n− `− t
n− 2t v˜
n−1
`−1 (t, a, b)⊗ {n},
and (31) again follows by linearity.
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Algorithm 3 Quantum Fourier Transform of the module Mn
Given: Positive integer n, and registers A, B, T and L as described above.
Action: Transformation |t〉T|`〉L|x〉B 7→ |e`(t, x)〉A.
1. While n > 1:
(a) Let T← T− Bn
(b) Perform the unitary qubit transformation
|0〉 7→
√
n− `− t
n− 2t |0〉+
√
`− t
n− 2t |1〉, |1〉 7→
√
`− t
n− 2t |0〉 −
√
n− `− t
n− 2t |1〉
on Bn, conditioned on the content |t〉T|`〉L of the registers T and L (and on 2t < n and
t ≤ ` ≤ n− t.)
(c) Swap Bn and An, let L← L− An and n← n− 1.
2. Implement the necessary transformation in the case n = 1.
Quantum Fourier transform. With Claim 5.13 in hand, it is easy to describe the algorithm
of Theorem 5.10. Both A and B are represented as arrays of qubits A1, . . . ,An and B1, . . . ,Bn,
respectively. A standard basis element S ∈ Mn is represented as |S〉A, where Ai contains 1 iff
i ∈ S. A string x = (xi) ∈ {0, 1}n is represented as |x〉B, where Bi stores xi. The transformation is
described in Algorithm 3.
The correctness of the algorithm can be proven by induction on n. The base case n = 1 is trivial.
Next, for a fixed value of n, the first iteration of the loop in Step 1 performs the transformation
|t〉T|`〉L|0〉Bn 7→
√
n− `− t
n− 2t |t〉T|`〉L|0〉An +
√
`− t
n− 2t |t〉T|`− 1〉L|1〉An
|t+ 1〉T|`〉L|1〉Bn 7→
√
`− t
n− 2t |t〉T|`〉L|0〉An −
√
n− `− t
n− 2t |t〉T|`− 1〉L|1〉An
By the inductive assumption, the remaining iterations of the loop and Step 2 correctly perform the
Quantum Fourier Transform of Mn−1, hence, the whole algorithm performs the Quantum Fourier
Transform of Mn due to Claim 5.13.
Using standard techniques, each iteration of the loop can be performed with sufficiently high
precision in time polylog(n). Specifically, the one-qubit transformation for part (b) can be imple-
mented (conditioned on t and `) with sufficiently high precision using polylog(n) gates from any
universal set of elementary gates. The error (in the operator norm) of this algorithm can be made
smaller than any inverse polynomial. The second step takes time O(1). The total time complexity
of the algorithm is thus O˜(n).
6 Quantum lower bound for junta testing
Let us assume that ε = Ω(1). Tight classical lower bounds on junta testing [26, 18] are based
on distinguishing a k-junta from a function that depends on k + O(1) variables. As noted by
Atıcı and Servedio [4], this approach is doomed in the quantum setting because these two cases
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can be distinguished in O(log k) quantum queries as follows. For a function that depends on only
k+O(1) variables but is far from any k-junta, it follows from Lemma 2.14 that at least one of the
O(1) “extra” variables has Ω(1) influence. Hence there exists a subset S ⊆ [n] of k + 1 variables
each having influence Ω(1). Each of those k + 1 variables will occur in a Fourier Sample with
constant probability, so the probability that a fixed variable from S is not seen in t Fourier Samples
is exponentially small in t. By the union bound, after t = O(log k) Fourier Samples, with high
probability all k + 1 variables of S will have been seen and we can conclude the function is not a
k-junta.
Instead of this, Atıcı and Servedio presented a different approach based on distinguishing a
k-junta from a function that depends on k + Ω(k) variables. Using this technique, they proved an
Ω(
√
k) lower bound for a special class of non-adaptive quantum algorithms.
In this section, we give an explicit description of the Atıcı-Servedio construction, and use it to
prove a quantum lower bound for the junta testing problem. Consider the following problem.
Definition 6.1 (Testing the image size). An image size tester, given oracle access to a function
g : [m] → [n], is required to distinguish whether the image of g is of size at most `, or g is ε-far
away from any such function.
It turns out that a junta tester can be used to solve this problem. The connection is through
the following ancillary function.
Definition 6.2 (Addressing function). Assume that m is a power of two, and g : [m] → [n] is
a function. We define the corresponding addressing function f : {0, 1}n+logm → {±1} as follows.
Interpret the input string x of f as a concatenation yz with y ∈ {0, 1}n and z ∈ {0, 1}logm = [m].
Then, f(x) = (−1)yg(z) . The variables in y are called addressed variables, and the variables in z are
called the address variables.
It is easy to see that a quantum query to f can be simulated by two quantum queries to g: one
to compute g(z), and one to uncompute it.
Lemma 6.3. For a function g : [m]→ [n] with m a power of 2, let f : {0, 1}n+logm → {±1} be the
corresponding addressing function. Let ` ≥ 1 be an integer and define k = `+ logm. If the size of
the image of g does not exceed `, then f is a k-junta. Conversely, if g is ε-far from any function
with an image of size at most `, then f is ε′/2-far from any k-junta where ε′ = ε− (logm)/k.
Proof. The first statement is obvious. So assume g is ε-far from any function with an image of
size at most `. We claim that g is also ε′-far from any function with an image of size at most k.
Indeed, if h is a function with image of size at most k, we can reduce its image to be of size at most
` by modifying it on at most a (logm)/k fraction of inputs corresponding to the “least popular”
outputs.
In order to show that f is ε′/2-far from any k-junta, take an arbitrary k-subset W ⊆ [n+logm],
and any Boolean function h depending only on the variables in W . We want to show that f is
ε′/2-far from h. Indeed, by the previous claim, at least ε′ fraction of the inputs to g map to indices
outside W ∩ [n]. For any such z ∈ [m], and any y ∈ {0, 1}n, exactly one x ∈ {yz, y⊕g(z)z} satisfies
f(x) 6= h(x) (where x⊕j stands for x with the jth bit flipped). Hence, the distance between f and
h is at least ε′/2.
Let us now state some corollaries of this result. First, we get an upper bound on the quantum
query complexity of testing the support size.
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Corollary 6.4. If logm = o(`), the image size can be tested in O
(√
`/ε log `
)
quantum queries.
More importantly, however, we get a lower bound on the quantum query complexity of junta
testing. This is based on the following well-known special case of the image size testing problem.
Definition 6.5 (Collision Problem [21]). Let m be an even integer, and n ∈ N. In the collision
problem, one is given oracle access to a function g : [m] → [n], that is either 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. The
task is decide which is the case.
Brassard et al. [21] constructed a quantum O(m1/3)-query algorithm for the collision problem.
Later, Aaronson and Shi [1] proved a matching lower bound:
Theorem 6.6. The bounded-error quantum query complexity of the collision problem is Ω(m1/3).
If g : [m]→ [n] is 2-to-1, then its image size is m/2 and the corresponding addressing function
f depends on only m/2 + logm variables. On the other hand, if g is 1-to-1, then its image size is
m and f depends on m + logm variables. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 6.3 that f is 1/5-far
from any (m/2 + logm)-junta if m is large enough. Combined with Theorem 6.6, we get
Theorem 6.7. Every quantum tester that distinguishes k-juntas from functions that are 1/5-far
from any k-junta with bounded error, needs to make Ω(k1/3) queries to the function.
7 Conclusion and open problems
In this paper we presented quantum algorithms for testing several well known properties of Boolean
functions. Our main result is a quantum algorithm for the k-junta testing problem with query
complexity O(
√
k/ε log k), and a time-efficient implementation of this based on a new near-linear
time implementation of a shallow version of the quantum Fourier transform over the symmetric
group. The query complexity of our tester is almost quadratically better than the best previous
quantum tester and also almost quadratically better than the best-possible classical tester.
The topics for future work include:
1. Better lower bound for junta testing. The main open question is: what is the actual
quantum query complexity of this problem?
We believe that the true answer is around
√
k/ε but it is quite challenging to improve our
current lower bound of Ω(k1/3). Nevertheless, we think that Lemma 6.3 may give a lower
bound of Ω(k1/2−δ) for any δ > 0. In particular, we think that it should be possible to combine
the lower bound construction by Raskhodnikova et al. [46] with two recent developments in
quantum lower bounds: Zhandry’s new machinery for the polynomial method [54], which he
applied to the collision and the set equality problems [55], and Belovs’s and Rosmanis’s tight
adversary lower bounds for the same functions [14].
2. Better upper bound. Regarding the upper bound, we wonder if the log k factor can be
removed. This question is essentially equivalent to finding a solution to the adversary bound
for the GGT problem that works for all values of d simultaneously. By this, we mean a
feasible solution to (11) such that
∑
S⊆[n]
XS [[f, f ]] =
{
O(
√
k), if f is an IntersectsA function with |A| = k;
O
(√
k
d
)
, if f is an IntersectsA function with |A| = k + d > k.
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Note that our current solution does not satisfy this property because we use different rescaling
for each value of d. A different approach may be needed to obtain this property.
3. Other applications of QGGT and our QFT. Several of our algorithms are based on a
quantum algorithm for a group testing problem, QGGT, which we find quite interesting in
its own right, as it shows a quartic quantum-over-classical speedup. We think there might be
more applications for QGGT waiting to be found.
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A Proof of Proposition 2.11(b)
The proof of this result is the same as the proof of Theorem 2.6. We use the following easy properties
of semi-definite matrices.
Proposition A.1. Let A and B be positive semi-definite matrices of the same size. Then, the
following matrices are also positive semi-definite:
(a) obtained from A by simultaneously duplicating one of its rows and the same column;
(b) the Hadamard (entry-wise) product A ◦B.
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First, trivially, 
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
  0.
For j ∈ [n], use Proposition A.1(a) to duplicate rows and columns of this matrix, so that its rows
correspond to the following four groups of inputs: z ∈ F−1(0), zj = 0; z ∈ F−1(0), zj = 1;
z ∈ F−1(1), zj = 0; and z ∈ F−1(1), zj = 1. We can take the Hadamard product of this matrix
and Xj , so we may assume without loss of generality that, for all x, y satisfying F (x) 6= F (y),
instead of (3b) we have the following stronger condition:
Xj [[x, y]] = 0 if xj = yj , and
∑
j∈[n]
Xj [[x, y]] = 1. (32)
Let X
(j)
i be an optimal solution to (3) for Gj . Then, we define a feasible solution X˜ji to (3) for
the composed function F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn) in the following way.
Let x = (x11, . . . , x1m1 , . . . , xn1, . . . , xnmn) be an input in the domain of F ◦ (G1, . . . , Gn).
Thus, there exists z in the domain of f such that zj = Gj(xj1, . . . , xjmj ) for all relevant j. Fix this
choice of z to x. Assume that y = (y11, . . . , y1m1 , . . . , yn1, . . . , ynmn) and t are defined analogously
to x and z, respectively. Then, define
X˜ji[[x, y]] = Xj [[z, t]]X
(j)
i [[(xj1, . . . , xjmj ), (yj1, . . . , yjmj )]],
where we extend X
(j)
i with zeroes for all inputs outside the domain of Gj .
First, X˜ji  0 due to Proposition A.1. Next, if F (z) 6= F (t), then∑
ji : xji 6=yji
X˜ji[[x, y]] =
∑
j∈[n]
Xj [[z, t]]
∑
i : xji 6=yji
X
(j)
i [[(xj1, . . . , xjmj ), (yj1, . . . , yjmj )]] =
∑
j∈[n]
Xj [[z, t]] = 1.
Here we used that if Xj [[z, t]] 6= 0, then j is relevant for both z and t, and Gj(xj1, . . . , xjmj ) 6=
Gj(yj1, . . . , yjmj ) because of (32). Finally, we have∑
ji
X˜ji[[x, x]] =
∑
j∈[n]
Xj [[z, z]]
∑
i
X
(j)
i [[(xj1, . . . , xjmj ), (xj1, . . . , xjmj )]] ≤ Q max
j∈[n]
ADV±(Gj).
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